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THE INSTITUTIONAL APPETITE FOR
“QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE”
Alicia J. Davis
This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal
corporate governance is associated with higher levels of
ownership by institutional investors. This finding is
consistent with the idea that institutions have greater reason
than individual investors to prefer well-governed firms, but
surprising given the substantial empirical evidence that casts
doubt on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms. The
study described in this Article also finds that higher quality
external governance is associated with lower proportions of
ownership by certain types of institutional investors, also a
somewhat surprising result given available empirical
evidence on the positive relationship between external
governance and firm performance. After largely dismissing
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competing explanations for these findings, I conclude that
institutional investors, as a group, generally prefer internal
governance
mechanisms
over
external
governance
mechanisms or have a higher tolerance for low-quality
external governance than for low-quality internal governance.
I argue that these preferences are reasonable and suggest that
when debating the efficacy of governance mechanisms, the
preferences of informed, sophisticated investors be afforded
greater weight than is currently the case.
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INTRODUCTION

Reading much of the legal scholarship from the last
decade on U.S. corporate governance would leave one with
the definite impression that the laws in the area are
arbitrary and run counter to the evidence on the appropriate
regulation of business activity. For example, ten years ago,
Professor Roberta Romano roundly panned The SarbanesOxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or “SOX”), which was passed by
Congress in the wake of large-scale accounting fraud
scandals.1 According to Professor Romano, empirical
research on the substantive corporate governance mandates
of Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrated that the required
governance devices, including a mandate for all public
companies to have 100% independent audit committees,
would neither address the problem of accounting fraud nor
increase firm value. This observation led Professor Romano
to charge Congress with engaging in “quack corporate
governance,” i.e., legislating without regard to the relevant
empirical research.
This charge was echoed by others in the academy2 and
later applied to the governance mandates in The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”), Congress’ response to the 2008 financial crisis. In a
piece titled “Dodd Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round II,” Professor Stephen Bainbridge echoes
the criticism leveled by Professor Romano against SarbanesOxley and argues that Dodd-Frank’s governance mandates,
including a requirement for all public companies to have
fully independent compensation committees, have no basis in
empirical research.3
The corporate governance “quackery” label has found
application beyond Congressional legislation. Commercial
1 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
2 See infra Part II.A.
3 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1805 (2011).
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service providers, such as proxy advisory firm Institutional
Shareholder Services (“ISS”), have developed metrics to
assess the strength of corporate governance practices, and
these metrics are now in widespread use by large,
sophisticated investors. Professor Paul Rose argues that the
corporate governance ratings touted by proxy advisory firms
lack empirical support, as there is little evidence of a
relationship between the governance practices encouraged by
the ratings system and increases in firm valuation.4 He is far
from alone in his criticism.5
What the corporate governance provisions of SOX and
Dodd-Frank and corporate governance ratings have in
common is either an exclusive (in the case of SOX and DoddFrank) or predominate (in the case of governance ratings)
focus on internal governance mechanisms––those things that
relate to how the corporation is managed internally (e.g.,
independence of the board of directors). Very little is known
about what works in corporate governance, and the empirical
evidence on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms
is mixed, at best. Therefore, those academics critical of SOX,
Dodd-Frank, and corporate governance ratings have
understandably seized on the bevy of research that fails to
show consistent relationships between internal governance
quality and firm value.
Many reasons for Congress’ purportedly wrong-headed
focus on internal governance mechanisms in the
promulgation of SOX and Dodd-Frank have been offered.
These reasons relate to the vagaries of politics, the pressure
that comes from legislating in times of crisis, and limited
Congressional capacity to critically evaluate empirical
research.6 Similarly, pecuniary incentives have been
proffered as the reason behind the commercial corporate
governance industry’s interest in selling corporate
governance ratings without regard to whether there is solid
empirical evidence to suggest that the governance
See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L.
887, 910, 912, 914 (2007).
5 See infra Part II.B.
6 See infra Part II.A.
4
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mechanisms encouraged by the ratings systems improve
corporate performance.7 The basic claim of the critics is that
governance devices of, at best, questionable efficacy have
been thrust upon the business community, either by
legislative fiat or ratings pressure, to the detriment of firm
value.
In stark contrast to the prevailing views on internal
corporate governance, academics are largely united in their
belief in the effectiveness of external governance––firm
characteristics that maximize vulnerability to hostile
takeovers (e.g., lack of a poison pill or classified board)8––in
enhancing shareholder value. The received wisdom in the
academy is that the only form of “effective governance”
documented in the research literature is external corporate
governance.9 Proponents of high-quality external governance
assert that takeovers in the “market for corporate control”
create value for shareholders,10 and Professor Lucian
Bebchuk, for example, is leading the charge (and drawing the
ire of prominent advocates of director primacy)11 to enhance
shareholder power through the strengthening of external
governance.
The line of demarcation between internal and external
governance is not fixed, of course. There is an overlap
between the two categories, and the two purportedly
different types of governance mechanisms sometimes rely on
one another for effectiveness.12 Indeed, there is evidence that
external and internal governance are complements (i.e.,
exposure to the market for corporate control is only effective
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C. for the definitions of a poison pill and a classified
(i.e., staggered) board.
9 See infra Part II.C.
10 See infra Part II.C. for a discussion of this point.
11 See Memorandum from Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the
Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Company, Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz (Feb. 22, 2013), in ACTIVIST REP. 4 (Apr. 2013), available at
http://hl.com/email/pdf/the-activist-report-april2013.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/N834-LVK2.
12 David A. Skeel, Jr. et al., Inside-Out Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 147, 150–51 (2011).
7
8

DAVIS – FINAL

6

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2015

if there is strong internal governance in the form of a large
monitoring stockholder that can facilitate a takeover).13 That
said, researchers tend to think about types of governance
devices that are internal to an organization separately from
those mechanisms that serve to either facilitate or impede
third-party takeover attempts.
In light of the evidence on the efficacy of various
governance practices, Professor Jonathan Macey argues that
a regulatory paradox exists. He argues that Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), and the
highly influential proxy advisory firms who promulgate
commercial
ratings
promote
internal
governance
mechanisms, which have not proven effective, while
Congress, state legislatures, and courts not only fail to
promote a robust market for corporate control, but also
impede its effectiveness by sanctioning both the
implementation of antitakeover mechanisms and their
maintenance in the face of a hostile bid.14
There have been thousands of law review articles written
about corporate governance in the past ten years.15 It is fair
to say that the motivations and preferences of legislators,
academics, courts, and, even to some extent, commercial
governance ratings agencies have been thoroughly explored.
13 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance
Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 60 J. FIN. 2859, 2860 (2005); infra Part II.
14 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 46 (2008).
15 A Westlaw search for law review articles published between March
16, 2005, and March 15, 2015, with the term “corporate governance” in the
title returns 442 results. Westlaw Search with “Corporate Governance” in
the Title, WESTLAWNEXT, http://westlawnext.com (last visited Mar. 23,
2015) (search for “advanced: (TITLE(“corporate governance”)) & DA(aft 0315-2005 & bef 03-16-2015),” filter for “Secondary Sources” then “Law
Reviews & Journals”). The same search for law review articles with the
term “corporate governance” appearing at least five times anywhere in the
document yields 2,845 results. Westlaw Search with “Corporate
Governance” at Least Five Times, WESTLAWNEXT, http://westlawnext.com
(last visited Mar. 23, 2015) (search for “advanced: (ATLEAST5(“corporate
governance”)) & DA(aft 03-15-2005 & bef 03-16-2015),” filter for
“Secondary Sources” then “Law Reviews & Journals”). These results do not
include articles written in finance or other business journals on this topic.
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What is missing from the empirical corporate governance
literature is a comprehensive, detailed review of the
governance preferences of an important constituency––
investors. The relationship between institutional ownership
and governance has been explored previously. For example,
Professors Kee Chung and Hao Zhang show that higher
proportions of institutional ownership are associated with
higher governance quality as measured by fifty governance
characteristics derived from ISS’ corporate governance
database.16 Professors Brian Bushee, Mary Ellen Carter and
Joseph Gerakos find little evidence of any association
between corporate governance and institutional ownership
overall, but do find that a subset of what they term
“governance sensitive” institutions exhibits preferences for
certain types of governance mechanisms.17 However, none of
the previously produced studies explore the internal/external
governance dichotomy or attempt to ascertain whether
institutions generally or particular types of institutions
prefer certain governance mechanisms to others. This paper
is, to my knowledge, the first to do so.
This omission from the literature is odd since SarbanesOxley and Dodd-Frank were designed to “restore investor
confidence” and “protect investors” following substantial
lapses in corporate governance.18 Gaining an understanding
of the specific governance preferences of the “protected class”
makes sense. Of course, if the protected class is uninformed
or incapable of understanding what is in its best interests,
and one is apt to adopt a paternalistic approach to
regulation, then one might pay scant attention to the

16 Kee H. Chung & Hao Zhang, Corporate Governance and
Institutional Ownership, 46 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 247, 269–70
(2011).
17 Brian J. Bushee, Mary Ellen Carter & Joseph Gerakos,
Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanisms, J.
MGMT. ACCT. RES. (forthcoming June 2013) (manuscript at 3).
18 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002); Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 7, 45, 61 (2005) (testimony of Hon. William H.
Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
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preferences of the protected class. However, if there is a
group within the protected class that has reason to prefer
well-governed firms and that is capable of assessing the
value of governance practices, then understanding its
preferences can help inform policy debates. With respect to
corporate governance, such a group exists––namely,
sophisticated institutional investors.
Most retail (individual) investors, given their small
investment stakes, rationally opt not to expend time, effort,
and money monitoring the corporate governance practices of
the firms in which they invest.19 On the other hand,
19 A number of researchers have provided reasons for why retail
investors care less about corporate governance than institutional
investors. For example, Professors Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, in
describing the free-rider problem, note that it is not cost effective for small
shareholders to monitor management. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D.
Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42, 42 (1980). Evidence supports the view
that retail investors are generally passive with respect to governance
matters. Not only are there few reported instances of retail investors
waging activist campaigns to force governance changes, but individual
investors also vote in corporate elections at a low rate. The percentage of
retail investors participating in routine corporate elections is estimated to
be approximately 20% on average and is as low as 5% at some firms.
Frank G. Zarb, Jr., Restoring Balance in Proxy Voting: The Case For
“Client Directed Voting,” HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (Feb. 14, 2010, 8:39 AM), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2010/02/14/restoring-balance-in-proxy-voting-the-case-for-client-directedvoting/, archived at http://perma.cc/3RMA-JXNV. Therefore, individual
investors are largely believed to focus less on corporate governance than
institutions do. However, despite the hypotheses set forth by researchers
and the voting evidence, survey evidence calls into question the notion
that individual investors are largely indifferent to corporate governance.
Professors Jeffrey Cohen, Lori Holder-Webb, Leda Nath, and David Wood
surveyed 750 retail investors and asked them questions about the types of
non-financial information they use when making investment (buy-sell)
decisions. Not surprisingly, retail investors used non-financial information
directly related to economic performance the most, with over 60% of those
surveyed indicating that, for example, they frequently use information on
market share and product innovation. However, a substantial percentage
of respondents (ranging anywhere from approximately 38% for board
selection processes to 52% for executive compensation) also revealed that
they frequently use various types of corporate governance information
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institutional investors, because of their relatively larger
stakes, have more incentive to monitor, particularly if it is
costly to exit.20 Since owning shares in a well-governed firm
reduces an investor’s own monitoring costs, such investments
are attractive to institutional investors. In addition,
institutions, because of fiduciary duty concerns, are more
vigilant about making “prudent” investments that are less
likely to lead to large losses. Institutional investors also
prefer well-governed firms because there is evidence that
suggests the stocks of such firms have higher liquidity and
lower associated trading costs.21
This Article describes a study that provides detailed data
on institutional investor governance preferences. To the
extent any conclusions can be reached in this area, the
weight of the empirical evidence on corporate governance
suggests that returns are enhanced by investing in firms
with (at least) high-quality external governance. Therefore, a
reasonable hypothesis, given the previously available
evidence, would be that institutional ownership is associated
with high-quality external governance. Though I find that
high-quality external governance in the form of annual
director elections (i.e., non-staggered boards) is associated
with higher proportions of overall institutional ownership in
one model specification (a relationship likely driven largely
by mutual fund preferences), in another model specification,
higher external governance quality as quantified by the GIndex, a measure of exposure to the market for corporate
control, is associated with lower proportions of overall
when making investment decisions. On average, however, the investors
surveyed indicated that, though they consider corporate governance
information, they do not rely on it heavily in their decision making
processes. Jeffrey Cohen, et al., Retail Investors’ Perceptions of the
Decision-Usefulness of Economic Performance, Governance, and Corporate
Social Responsibility Disclosures, 23 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 109, 116, 117 tbl.3
(2011).
20 Chung & Zhang, supra note 16, at 250. To be sure, a number of
institutional investors also appear largely indifferent to corporate
governance, but the claim being raised here relates to their interest, as a
group, relative to individual investors’ interest, as a group.
21 Id. at 250–51.
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institutional ownership. This study’s results also reveal that
there is a relationship between ownership by certain
institutional investors, including, most notably, public
pension funds, and low-quality external corporate
governance in most model specifications. My analysis also
reveals that high-quality internal governance, as measured
by internally-focused governance metrics such as the ISS
Corporate Governance Quotient (“ISS CGQ”), is associated
with higher proportions of overall institutional ownership.
Overall, the evidence reveals a relationship between
institutional ownership, on the one hand, and high-quality
internal governance and, in some cases, low-quality external
governance, on the other hand.
One note of clarification is in order. This study reveals
institutional investor preferences relative to those of other
market participants (i.e., individual investors)22 and suggests
that institutions value purportedly high-quality internal
governance more highly than individual investors and
purportedly high-quality external governance less highly
than individual investors. Thus, when I describe
institutional investor “preferences” in this paper, I am
referring to their “relative preferences.”
In capital markets equilibrium, all stocks are held by
someone, and all firms have owners. The stock price tells us
how the market as a whole values a particular set of firm
characteristics. This study does not compare the stock prices
of firms with particular governance characteristics to
determine overall market preferences. Rather, it looks at
which investors hold the stock of certain types of firms and
compares the number of shares held by institutions with
those held by individuals. The study’s results suggest that (1)
institutions self-select into firms with (and/or encourage
firms to adopt mechanisms that reflect) purportedly highIn this study, “institutional investor” is defined as institutions with
$100 million or more under discretionary management. See infra note 181.
For ease of exposition, I refer to market participants other than these
institutions, which include individual investors, as well as institutions
with less than $100 million under discretionary management, as
“individual investors.”
22
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quality internal governance, and (2), in some cases, selfselect into firms with (and/or encourage firms to adopt
mechanisms that reflect) purportedly low-quality external
governance.
Assume for the sake of argument that all investors agree
that better corporate governance leads to better firm
performance. If this were the case, we would expect better
governance to be priced into the stock (i.e., better governed
firms, all else being equal, would have higher market
valuations). Note, however, that not everyone will increase
their investment in firms that improve the quality of
corporate governance or buy the stock of firms with highquality governance characteristics. Instead, those that value
the characteristics most highly (and are willing to pay for the
attributes) will outbid those investors that value the
characteristics less highly. The results of the instant study,
which reveal higher institutional investment in firms with
high-quality internal governance and, in many cases, lower
institutional investment in firms with high-quality external
governance, suggest that, on the whole, institutional
investors believe that internal governance quality is more
likely than external governance quality, holding all else
equal, to lead to better firm performance.
This all suggests that institutional investors, like
Congress, prefer “quack corporate governance”––what I am
using as a generic term23 for governance mechanisms upon

23 Though my results show a preference for greater director
independence, which underlies the reasoning for audit and compensation
committee independence requirements, my data do not reveal a direct
association between institutional ownership and the particular elements of
SOX to which Professor Romano refers as examples of “quack corporate
governance” (i.e., independent audit committees, restrictions on the
provision of non-audit services, executive certification of financial
statements, and the prohibition on executive loans). My data also do not
reveal a direct association between institutional ownership and the
particular elements of Dodd-Frank upon which Professor Bainbridge
focuses (i.e., mandated shareholder advisory votes on executive
compensation, independent compensation committees, new compensation
disclosure requirements, affirmation of the SEC’s authority to promulgate
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whose efficacy the empirical evidence casts substantial
doubt. One could draw a number of conclusions about the
reasons for these governance preferences of institutional
investors. It could be the case that institutional investors are
just as misinformed as Congress or that some institutional
investors have political agendas unrelated to wealth
maximization and invest to advance policy goals rather than
profitability. It is also possible that institutional money
managers
are
blindly
following
the
governance
recommendations of proxy advisory firms such as ISS
without independent evaluation of the efficacy of the
mechanisms promoted in the ratings index either due to
laziness or due to a desire to insulate themselves from
criticism should there turn out to be a significant governance
breakdown at one of their portfolio firms. For reasons I
discuss in Section IV, I find all of these potential
explanations wanting and conclude instead that the most
likely explanation is that these preferences exist because
institutional investors believe high-quality internal
governance devices to be value enhancing.
I argue that my findings have significant implications for
the quack corporate governance debate. Stockholders, as the
residual claimants of a corporation, bear the costs of both
poor governance and the implementation of ineffective
governance mechanisms. Institutions, which are run by
professional managers, know their preferences better than
legislators or academics. If these sophisticated investors
prefer high-quality internal governance over high-quality
external governance, despite the seemingly limited empirical
support for internal governance devices, this preference
should be afforded greater weight than is currently the case
in the debate about the efficacy of these mechanisms.
The seeming preference by some types of institutional
investors for low-quality external governance demonstrated
in this study is a bit more surprising, particularly in light of
the public opposition by certain prominent public pension

rules related to shareholder proxy access for director nominees and
disclosure of dual CEO/Chairman positions).
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funds to antitakeover devices such as staggered boards. One
reason for this apparent inconsistency could be that the
corporate governance groups of many institutional investors
are responsible for voting and proxy decisions, while the
portfolio managers are responsible for investing decisions.24
The corporate governance groups’ raison d’etre is to impose
“best practices” on portfolio companies. For years, wellknown and highly respected legal scholars have repeatedly
made the case that antitakeover devices are value
destroying.25 It is not surprising, then, that those tasked
with improving corporate governance would find such
mechanisms objectionable. Those investing, however, may
have different priorities.
These different priorities may arise because portfolio
managers, perhaps more than members of corporate
governance staffs,26 realize that external governance is
costly. Though many internal governance improvements
(e.g., replacing inside directors with outside directors) are
relatively inexpensive, for companies with the highest levels
of vulnerability to hostile activity, removing protective
devices (e.g., de-staggering the board) has significant
ramifications. Portfolio managers realize the trade-offs
inherent in holding management accountable and protecting
their portfolio companies against opportunistic attack. These
managers may err on the side of preferring or at least
tolerating protective devices, secure in the knowledge that,
as large investors, they have some ability to pressure
management into accepting a truly value-enhancing
takeover bid, should one materialize, despite the presence of
defensive mechanisms. In addition, there is limited evidence
that takeover defenses, including staggered boards, are

24 Brandon S. Gold, Agents Unchained: The Determinant of Takeover
Defenses in IPO Firms 56 (May 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2262095,
archived at http://perma.cc/8THY-9X57.
25 See infra Part II.C.
26 But see infra note 304 for evidence of a willingness to be flexible on
some governance matters for IPO firms.
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associated with higher firm values.27 Therefore, portfolio
managers who invest in firms with antitakeover mechanisms
in place may be acting rationally. Given these facts, I submit
that, before criticizing legislators or courts for impeding the
market for corporate control by making it easier for boards to
resist hostile activity, one might want to consider the role
institutional investors play in the perpetuation of
antitakeover devices.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly discusses
the state of the empirical literature with respect to corporate
governance and describes some recent efforts to improve
corporate governance in the United States, specifically
through Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank. Part III describes
the data and analytical methodologies of this study and
presents results. Part IV considers the policy implications of
these findings and also considers alternative explanations for
the revealed governance preferences of institutional
investors. Part V concludes.

II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
In the modern public corporation, the separation between
ownership (i.e., by thousands of dispersed shareholders) and
control (i.e., by professional managers)28 creates agency
costs.29 Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to

See infra Part II.C.
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 120–21 (1932).
29 There are three principal components of agency costs: (1)
monitoring costs, the costs undertaken by the principal to limit divergence
from her interests (e.g., developing appropriate incentives, costs of
monitoring to limit the aberrant activities of the agent); (2) bonding costs,
the costs of the agent to guarantee that she will not take certain actions to
harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if
she does take those actions (e.g., insurance policy, financial penalty
clause); and (3) residual loss, or the dollar value of the reduction in the
principal’s welfare due to the agent’s divergence from activities that would
maximize the principal’s welfare. Residual loss is the loss that is left over
after the incurrence of any monitoring and bonding costs. Michael C.
27
28
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increase managerial accountability,30 thereby decreasing
agency costs. With every new scandal––ranging from the
massive accounting frauds of Enron and WorldCom in the
early 2000s to the collapse or near collapse of large financial
institutions during the 2008 financial crisis––confidence in
the ability of corporate governance mechanisms to reign in
managerial excess wanes, leading to capital markets
turmoil.31
This repeating cycle of crisis and turmoil leads to a
continuous call for governance reform. Therefore,
understanding what works in corporate governance is
critical. There have been thousands of studies undertaken by
law and finance professors that attempt to ascertain what
mechanisms––both
internal
and
external––increase
shareholder value and minimize agency costs. Though no
complete consensus on what does and does not work in
corporate governance exists, the weight of the evidence
seems to suggest that there is little to no relationship
between internal governance quality and firm value. On the
other hand, the empirical literature seems to suggest that
there is a strong relationship between high-quality external
governance (i.e., high exposure to the market for corporate
control) and shareholder value. In this Part, I briefly
describe the literature on corporate governance in the
context of efforts to improve corporate performance through
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, corporate governance ratings,
and the market for corporate control.

A. Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank and Director
Independence
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in July 2002, was
Congress’ response to the waning confidence in the capital
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
30 See generally Douglas M. Branson, Proposals for Corporate
Governance Reform: Six Decades of Ineptitude and Counting, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 673, 676 (2013).
31 Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77
U. CHI. L. REV. 923, 925–27 (2010).
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markets in the early 2000s. SOX contained substantial
regulations affecting the corporate governance practices of
public corporations, including the following governance
mandates: (1) a requirement that company audit committees
be composed exclusively of independent directors, (2) a ban
on the provision of non-audit services by corporate auditors,
(3) a ban on the provision of loans by the corporation to
executives, and (4) a requirement for executive certification
of financial statements.32 Sarbanes-Oxley ushered in a new
era of federal regulation and invited its share of criticism,
both substantive and process-oriented.
Since the passage of SOX, the most vocal opponent of the
legislation in the legal academy has been Professor Roberta
Romano. She argues that no case exists for the primary
corporate governance provisions contained in SarbanesOxley.33 In a well-known article, Professor Romano
methodically walks through each governance mandate in
SOX and argues that each one was “seriously misconceived,”
as the “extensive empirical literature” suggested that these
mandates were unlikely to either improve the quality of
financial audits or improve corporate performance and
provide benefits to investors. 34 This is puzzling, she argues,
as she wonders what type of legislative process could result
in laws that in all likelihood would not generate their
intended effect, namely an increase in shareholder welfare.35
The story Professor Romano tells is one of legislating in a
time of crisis. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was adopted in July
2002, less than one year after Enron’s implosion, amid a

32 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2013) (nonaudit services ban); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 402, 15 U.S.C. §78m
(2013) (ban on loans to executives); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18
U.S.C. § 1350 (2013) (executive officer certification); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 775,775–77 (2002) (audit
committee independence); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 777,777–78 (2002) (executive officer certification).
33 Romano, supra note 1, at 1543.
34 See id. at 1602.
35 Id. at 1543.
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sharply declining stock market.36 Beginning in December
2001, Congress held a number of hearings on Enron’s failure,
its causes and potential legislative solutions.37 In April 2002,
the House of Representatives passed a bill following seven
hearings in the House Financial Services Committee.38
However, the Senate did not consider any legislation until
shortly after WorldCom’s collapse in July 2002.39
WorldCom’s demise followed revelations of accounting
fraud, corporate misconduct, and bankruptcy filings at a
number of leading public companies such as Tyco, Adelphia,
and Global Crossing.40 Moreover, the stock market dropped
precipitously during the time Congress was considering
Sarbanes-Oxley,41 with a sharp market decline beginning in
April 2002, and a bottoming out in July 2002.42 The market’s
July 2002 low, which occurred on the second trading day
after WorldCom’s bankruptcy filing and the day before the
conference committee reported out a bill (July 23),
represented a decline of more than one-third in value over
the prior year.43 In short, Congress was operating in an
environment of staggering investor losses and low investor
confidence.44 Given the steep market decline from April to
July 2002, members of Congress perceived that legislative
inaction was not an option.45
Professor Romano is highly critical of the Congressional
legislative process and argues that this crisis situation led to
the adoption of laws that the scholarly literature showed
would not be effective. According to Professor Romano, the
relevant evidence either went unnoticed or was ignored by

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 1544.
Id.
Id. at 1545.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1546.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1549.
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Congress,46 and the witnesses called during the hearing
process not only failed to enlighten Congress about the state
of the empirical literature,47 but, in some cases, so-called
“policy entrepreneurs” brought their own misguided agendas
for governance reform.48
It is noteworthy that, despite Sarbanes-Oxley’s stated
purpose of restoring “investor confidence,” investors played
only a minor role in the SOX hearings. Only five of the sixtyfive witnesses (7.7%) called by Congress during the House
and
Senate
hearings
were
institutional
investor
representatives.49 One of these witnesses, John Biggs, CEO
of TIAA-CREF, was called not as a representative of TIAACREF, but rather, due to his role as a member of the Blue
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of
Corporate Audit Committees and the Public Oversight
Board.50 In contrast, academics and policy analysts
comprised eight of the total sixty-five witnesses (12.3%),
while current or former government officials comprised
eighteen of the sixty-five (27.7%).51
Professor Romano points to an extensive body of
literature that, she argues, demonstrates that the
governance provisions in SOX would not generate their
intended effects. She describes studies that not only find that
independent boards fail to improve corporate performance,
but also suggest that having too many outsiders on a board

Id. at 1526.
See, e.g., id. at 1575–76 (“Millstein in his testimony never referred
to the existence of a literature at odds with his position on board
independence, of which he was fully aware, given that he had coauthored
an article at variance with the literature on the point. The literature was
instead treated as though it did not exist.”). Note that Millstein’s specific
independence recommendations referred to the full board (a substantial
majority), nominating committees, and compensation committees.
48 The idea for fully independent audit committees, for example,
appears to have come from former SEC Chief Accountants Lynn Turner
and Michael Sutton, both witnesses at the Senate hearing. See id. at 1574.
49 Id. at 1569.
50 See id. at 1571 n.139.
51 See id. at 1569 tbl.3.
46
47
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can be harmful.52 She acknowledges that the literature on
the relationship between audit committee independence
specifically and firm performance is not as extensive as that
on full board independence (there are four studies on which
Professor Romano relies), but points out that none of those
studies finds any relationship between audit committee
independence and company performance.53 Professor
Romano further notes that of sixteen studies on the
relationship between audit committee independence and
financial reporting misconduct, ten fail to find that full audit
committee independence lessens accounting improprieties,
and one yields inconsistent results.54 She acknowledges that
five studies do show some relationship between full audit
committee independence and fewer cases of financial
reporting misconduct.55 Overall, however, Professor Romano
believes this hardly constitutes a case for the SOX audit
committee mandate.
Professor Romano is not alone in her skepticism.
Professor Larry Ribstein, for example, writes:
Post-Enron reforms, including Sarbanes-Oxley, rely
on increased monitoring by independent directors,
auditors, and regulators who have both weak
incentives and low-level access to information. This
monitoring has not been, and cannot be, an effective
way to deal with fraud by highly motivated insiders.
Moreover, the laws are likely to have significant
costs, including perverse incentives of managers,
increasing distrust and bureaucracy in firms, and
impeding information flows.56

Also, in response to New York Times business columnist
Joseph Nocera’s assertion that one of the benefits of SOX is
that auditors will no longer report to management and
See id. at 1530.
See id.
54 See id. at 1532.
55 See id. at app.A at 1604–05.
56 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3
(2002).
52
53
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instead will report to the audit committee, which must be
composed entirely of independent directors, Professor
Stephen Bainbridge remarked that “[n]obody has yet shown
that [this change] would have prevented debacles like Enron
or will do so in the future. Indeed, Enron itself had an
independent audit committee headed by Robert Jaedicke, a
professor of accounting at Stanford University, who could
hardly have been more qualified for the job.”57
The charge of quack corporate governance also has been
applied to the governance mandates contained in DoddFrank, legislation born of the worst U.S. and global financial
crisis since the Great Depression.58 The financial crisis
yielded a loss of $17 trillion of household wealth and the
shedding of 8.3 million jobs in the U.S. from 2008–2009.59 To
stem the crisis, the U.S. government undertook
extraordinary actions, including creating the $700 billion
TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) relief package and
investing an additional $787 billion in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, an economic stimulus
program.60 The financial industry disruptions were not
limited to the U.S., as many countries around the globe
required massive multi-billion dollar bailouts.61
Many believed that the crisis was largely caused by
ineffective regulation of the financial sector.62 In the midst of
the fall-out, Congress and the White House felt compelled to
act. In January 2009, a New York Times editorial called on
the leaders in Washington to make drastic changes to the
regulatory landscape and said, “[a]nything less than a new

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste,
Repenting in Leisure, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 69, 89 (2006).
58 Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29
YALE J. ON REG. 91, 92 (2012).
59 Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory
Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger
Regulatory System, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 182 (2012).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 182–83.
62 See, e.g., Barr, supra note 58, at 93–96 (discussing the origins of the
financial crisis).
57
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rules-based regime would be inadequate to the task of
restoring confidence and, eventually, reviving the
economy.”63 In July 2010, amid this environment of political
urgency and economic uncertainty, Congress enacted DoddFrank.64
The most sweeping piece of financial reform legislation
since the New Deal, Dodd-Frank, among other things,
comprehensively regulates derivatives markets, provides for
new means of data collection and financial sector
transparency, and creates a mechanism for the liquidation of
failing financial firms that does not put the economy or
taxpayers at risk.65 Dodd-Frank also created the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau and provided for new consumer
and investor protections.66
Additionally, Congress responded to a widespread belief
that executive compensation practices were part of the
problem. Specifically, there was a worry that incentive-based
compensation led to short-term thinking and excessive risktaking.67 Dodd-Frank therefore contains a number of
provisions intended to reduce this moral hazard and more
effectively tie executive pay to long-term performance.68
These provisions include mandating non-binding shareholder
advisory votes on executive compensation (Section 951),

Ludwig, supra note 59, at 183.
Id.
65 Barr, supra note 58, at 92.
66 Id.
67 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why
Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1047 (2012) (“Because a rapid shift towards
incentive-based compensation at financial institutions focused senior
management on short-term results, longer-term risks were ignored or
excessively discounted. For example, if the executives in charge of assetbacked securitizations at a financial institution could make $100 million in
bonuses in a single year if sufficient deals closed that year, such expected
compensation could easily produce a ‘damn-the-torpedoes, full-speedahead’ approach to risk taking. Indeed, why should executives so
compensated worry at all about the longer-term risks to their bank? Thus,
excessive compensation led to moral hazard.”).
68 Id. at 1065.
63
64
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disclosure of the ratio of CEO pay to that of the median
company employee (Section 953), mandating the recovery of
compensation awarded in error (Section 954), and disclosure
of director and employee hedging (Section 955). The
provision of Dodd-Frank most relevant for present purposes
is Section 952: “Compensation Committee Independence.”
Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to
promulgate a rule requiring the stock exchanges to mandate
that listed companies (with few exceptions) have
compensation committees made up entirely of independent
directors.69 Section 952 further requires the SEC to consider,
when developing its definition of “independence,” factors that
include whether the director receives any compensation from
the company (e.g., consulting fees) and whether the director
is affiliated with the company or any of its subsidiaries or
affiliates.70 In June 2012, the SEC adopted Rule 10C-1 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to implement this
provision,71 and on January 11, 2013, the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ finalized their listing standards,
which had an effective date of July 1, 2013, to comply with
Rule 10C-1.72
Professor Stephen Bainbridge, in his piece “Dodd Frank:
Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II,” criticizes
Dodd-Frank’s requirement of complete compensation
committee independence.73 The rationale for independent
69 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §
952(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1900, 1900 (2010).
70 Id. at 1901.
71 Melissa Maleske, NYSE and Nasdaq Propose Compensation
Committee Independence Standards, INSIDE COUNSEL (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/11/28/nyse-and-nasdaq-proposecompensation-committee-ind, archived at http://perma.cc/TFT7-M5DC.
72 J. Mark Poerio et al., NYSE and Nasdaq Issue FINAL Listing Rule
Changes for Compensation Committees and Compensation Advisers, PAUL
HASTINGS (Feb. 2013), http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/
2344.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/25SY-EQXD.
73 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1805. As it turns out, the new
standards did not represent a drastic change from prior practice. Since
2003, the NYSE had mandated 100% independent compensation
committees, and Nasdaq required either 100% independent compensation
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compensation committees lies in the assumption that
independent directors are more likely to bargain over
executive pay and, in turn, prevent excessive or illconsidered compensation.74 However, the available empirical
evidence, argues Professor Bainbridge, suggests that this is
not the case. Rather, studies show that director
independence does not lead to better compensation decisions.
Professor Bainbridge further notes that the independent
compensation committee provision was supported by the
Council of Institutional Investors, a pension fund trade
association, and describes it as a “one-size-fits-all model
being forced on all public companies.”75 In addition, Professor
Bainbridge asserts that, like other Dodd-Frank governance
mandates, the compensation committee independence
requirement lacks empirical support, as most studies reject
the hypothesis that independence is associated with better
firm performance or CEO compensation practices.76 Indeed,
committees or, in the absence of a standing compensation committee, all
executive compensation decisions to be made by majority vote of a firm’s
independent directors. See Maleske, supra note 71. Furthermore, the 2003
listing standards did not represent a dramatic leap from then-current
practice. Just prior to the institution of the stock exchange mandate for
full compensation committee independence, on average, 92% of
compensation committee members in a sample of 1,269 public companies
were independent, and 77% of the public companies in this sample had
fully independent compensation committees. See JOLENE DUGAN ET AL.,
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, BOARD PRACTICES/BOARD PAY 1, 20
(2006). These independence percentages are based on the definition of
independence set forth by ISS GRS and exclude directors who provide (or
have immediate family members or related entities that provide)
professional services to the company or an executive and also exclude
significant stockholders. Id. at 2. (This definition is more stringent than
that of the stock exchanges for independence. Thus, under the stock
exchange definition, a higher percentage of firms had independent
compensation committee members.) The new listing standards
promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank do include, however, as described
above, a heightened standard of independence and a new Nasdaq
requirement for a compensation committee. Poerio et al., supra note 72.
74 Erica Beecher-Monas, The Risks of Reward: The Role of Executive
Compensation in Financial Crisis, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 101, 120 (2011)
75 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1805.
76 Id.
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there is some evidence that higher levels of independence are
(counter-intuitively) associated with higher levels of
executive compensation.77
Not all scholars are as critical of Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank. Professor Jack Coffee, for example, though
acknowledging the shortcomings of the legislation, takes
exception with the characterizations of SOX and Dodd-Frank
set forth by Professors Romano and Bainbridge. He argues
that crises are rare opportunities to overcome legislative
inertia and effect necessary regulation.78 In addition,
Professors Robert Prentice and David Spence offer a defense
of SOX. They concede that Congress did not spend much (if
any) time reviewing the empirical literature related to
corporate governance before passing SOX.79 However, they
argue that it goes too far to allege that enacting legislation
inconsistent with the majority view of a large number of
disparate studies reaching wide-ranging conclusions is
“automatically [a] major gaffe. . . .”80 The scholars point to a
number of studies (some of which, they admit, were
conducted post-SOX enactment) that support the SOX
governance provisions criticized by Professor Romano and
others.81 Much of the evidence relates to the perennial
question of the efficacy of board independence.
The academic literature on the question of whether
having more independent boards increases firm value or
profitability is decidedly mixed, but there is evidence that
certain beneficial practices accompany higher levels of board
independence, including more willingness to replace
underperforming CEOs and creating more value in
connection with corporate takeovers.82 Also, according to
Beecher-Monas, supra note 74, at 121.
Coffee, supra note 67, at 1036.
79 Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack
Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J.
1843, 1845 (2007).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1865. See also id. at 1865 n.114 for a list of studies that detail
ways in which board independence is associated with creating value for
77
78
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Professors Andrew Fields and Phyllis Keys, there is
“overwhelming support among financial researchers for
outside directors providing beneficial monitoring and
advisory functions to firm shareholders.” 83
Professors Prentice and Spence further argue that
Congress passed SOX, not in hopes of improving firm
performance, but in hopes of improving the accuracy of
financial statements, stem the tide of corporate fraud,84 and
restore investor confidence.85 The empirical evidence,
Professors Prentice and Spence argue, does support the view
that higher levels of board independence translate into more
accurate financial reporting.86 For example, studies show
that firms with more independent boards engage in less
earnings management87 and accounting fraud, have more
informative financial statements and higher quality audits,
and are subject to fewer SEC enforcement actions and
shareholder lawsuits.88 Though the results of studies on the
relationship between earnings restatements and board
independence are mixed, the strong weight of the evidence is
that higher levels of board independence are associated with
more accurate financial reporting.89 Researchers studying
the relationship between audit committee independence
specifically and financial reporting quality find similar
results.90
shareholders in takeover situations, including studies finding an
association between board independence and larger abnormal returns in
management buyouts and an association between bidder firm board
independence and abnormal returns surrounding takeover announcement.
83 Id. at 1866–67.
84 Id. at 1868.
85 Id. at 1869.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1870–71.
89 Id. at 1871.
90 Id. at 1872–73. Note that there is some overlap between the studies
that Professors Prentice and Spence cite and those noted by Professor
Romano that indicate a relationship between audit committee
independence and financial reporting. See supra text accompanying note
55.
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Though the data are mixed, much of the available
empirical evidence does cast substantial doubt on the idea
that internal governance mechanisms such as independent
boards improve firm performance. Some scholars have
suggested reasons for why board independence may lack
empirical support. For example, Professor Jeff Gordon notes
that the benefits of director independence are systemic and
do not necessarily accrue to firms on an individual basis.91
Independent boards, he argues, lead to a culture of better
corporate governance, more reliable financial reporting, and
less accounting fraud, which benefits the market and society
as a whole.92 Such systemic benefits would not show up in
cross-sectional studies of firms.93 Therefore, an absence of
evidence with respect to the benefits of board independence
does not mean that there are no benefits. Professor Gordon
also offers another potential explanation: U.S. corporate
governance is so good that marginal improvements in any
particular governance mechanism are likely to have small, if
not negligible, effects on firm performance.94
Professor Jill Fisch offers the following perspective:
boards have evolved from “advisory boards” that primarily
counseled management on corporate strategy to “monitoring
boards” that evaluate managerial performance and attempt
to deter managerial impropriety.95 Professor Fisch argues
that since monitoring boards “do not offer corporations
strategic advice, operational analysis or other types of
managerial support . . . large-scale empirical studies are
unlikely to find a link between board monitoring and firm
performance.”96 The primary benefit of monitoring boards is
the ability to prevent managerial wrongdoing such as fraud.
Yet, assessing the deterrent value of a monitoring board is
Id. at 1869.
Id.
93 Id.
94 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007).
95 See id. at 1506.
96 Fisch, supra note 31, at 929.
91
92
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difficult, Professor Fisch argues, because one must engage in
an “impossible counterfactual analysis”: would management
have engaged in wrongdoing if not for the board’s actions?97
Professor Fisch further suggests that, if accurate stock
prices enhance market discipline, then perhaps board
effectiveness should be measured not by absolute price (i.e.,
how the board maximizes firm value), but instead by “price
quality” (i.e., the accuracy of financial disclosures that lead
to informed prices).98 This sentiment is consistent with a
theory espoused by Professor Gordon, who notes that
independent directors can serve a number of purposes,
including operating as “friction” in control markets and
providing the oversight necessary to yield the public good of
more accurate disclosures, thereby leading to more informed
stock prices and better allocation of capital.99

B. Corporate Governance Ratings
The story told by the SOX and Dodd-Frank critics is one
in which an inept and/or lazy Congress passed governance
mandates without stopping to consider the ample empirical
evidence that casts substantial doubt on the effectiveness of
the enacted provisions. This story is similar to the one told
by critics of commercial governance ratings firms, who claim
that firms such as ISS peddle voodoo ratings lacking
empirical foundation to naïve institutional investors for
profit.
Commercial service providers such as ISS and The
Corporate Library have developed metrics to assess the
strength of corporate governance in public companies. ISS,
the leading governance rating agency, will not disclose how
the various elements of its rating score, the CGQ, are
weighted, but has revealed that the most important
variables in generating a firm’s CGQ relate to audit
committee independence, financial expertise of audit
committee members, cost of executive and employee equity
97
98
99

Id.
Id. at 932.
Gordon, supra note 94, at 1469, 1564.
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issuances, board independence generally, director stock
ownership requirements, and incorporation in a state with
anti-takeover provisions.100 Thus, the rating appears to be
heavily weighted toward the quality of internal governance.
Professor Paul Rose is a leading critic of corporate
governance ratings and laments the use of “rules of thumb”
translated into hard metrics by governance ratings firms to
judge firms.101 He states, “good governance may affect firm
performance, but it is not clear that the variables selected by
governance ratings agencies are the appropriate metrics to
test and promote good firm performance.”102 Similarly,
Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld argues that the factors
considered in generating corporate governance ratings are
largely the product of “Wall Street superstitions” and “clichés
and myths, rather than . . . genuine research.”103 Professor
Sonnenfeld concedes that some of the variables in corporate
governance ratings are appropriate.104 However, Professor
Sonnenfeld says, “ISS . . . blend[s] these dimensions with
superstitious ones to create checklists of highly stringent
standards, regardless of the genuine research foundation to
support them.”105
Professors Lawrence Brown and Marcus Caylor, in a
study commissioned by ISS, find that higher corporate
governance scores based on ten of fifty-one governance
attributes derived from ISS data are associated with
relatively higher firm profitability, as measured by return on
equity and return on assets.106 However, Professors Sanjai

Rose, supra note 4, at 900–01. This information is based on the ISS
CGQ formula as it stood following the 2006 ratings guideline changes.
101 Id. at 910.
102 Id. at 913.
103 Id. at 910.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 913. Finding that only ten of the fifty-one attributes are
significantly and positively associated with company performance supports
the idea that corporate governance ratings can contain a lot of noise (i.e.,
only a subset of the attributes in the typical ratings indicators have any
relationship with firm performance). Id. at 913–14.
100
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Bhagat and Brian Bolton, using the full set of ISS corporate
governance metrics (not the subset used by Professors Brown
and Caylor), as well as the governance scores of ISS
competitor The Corporate Library, find that these
governance ratings are not significantly correlated with
either contemporaneous or future firm operating
performance, as measured by return on assets.107 This
evidence calls into question the relationship between
corporate governance ratings and firm value.
Other empirical evidence also casts serious doubt on the
efficacy of corporate governance indices. For example,
Professors Rob Daines, Ian Gow, and David Larcker, after
examining
corporate
ratings
produced
by
ISS,
GovernanceMetrics International, and The Corporate
Library, find little evidence that commercial corporate
governance ratings are particularly useful in predicting
future
operating
performance,
future
accounting
restatements, or future shareholder litigation.108 Similarly,
Professors Bhagat, Bolton, and Romano, after reviewing
governance indices generated by academics and commercial
ratings firms, conclude that there is little evidence of any
relationship between commercial ratings and firm
performance.109 As Professor Larcker, who along with
107 Id. at 914. Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance
and Firm Performance 5–6 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with
Columbia
Business
Law
Review),
available
at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.180.5811&rep=re
p1&type=pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H5E6-RXA7. Professors Bhagat
and Bolton use fifty-two ISS governance characteristics to construct the
governance score used in their analysis. Because Professors Bhagat and
Bolton do not list the fifty-two metrics in their paper, it is not possible to
know which additional governance characteristic they use in constructing
the ISS governance score that is not used by Professors Brown and Caylor.
Id. at 38 tbl.1. Recall that Professors Brown and Caylor construct a data
set using fifty-one ISS governance attributes. See supra note 106.
108 Robert M. Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the
Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings?, 98 J. FIN. ECON.
439, 440 (2010).
109 Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and
Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1850–52
(2008).
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Professors Scott Richardson and Irem Tuna, finds no
relationship between a variety of corporate governance
indicators and firm performance, states, “[l]ots of people are
coming up with governance scorecards . . . . They’re coming
up with best practices and selling this stuff. As far as we can
tell, there’s no evidence that those scorecards map into better
corporate performance or better behavior by managers.”110
Professor Rose argues that besides offering an inaccurate
assessment of the quality of a firm’s corporate governance,
rigid governance metrics have a more troubling systemic
impact: they serve to standardize governance mechanisms
and compel adherence to a fixed set of practices in a context
where flexibility would be more desirable.111 The
proliferation of one-size-fits-all governance scores can stifle
potentially beneficial managerial innovation.112 Though ISS’
governance recommendations are not mandatory as a matter
of law, given ISS’ influence in the institutional investor
community, firms feel compelled to comply, thus leading,
Professor Rose argues, to “a more homogenous corporate
population.”113

C. The Market for Corporate Control
Though many members of the academy tend to be
skeptical of internal governance mechanisms, external
governance mechanisms find broad support among legal
scholars. Hostile takeovers, under the conventional wisdom,
serve to discipline management and lead to higher
shareholder value. Poor firm performance leads to a lower
stock price, which makes it attractive for better management
to take over a company and, in turn, improve operations and
increase firm value. Given the benefits derived from hostile
takeovers, Professor Jonathan Macey argues that regulators
have it exactly backwards—the governance devices that are
most ineffective are championed, while the mechanisms most
110
111
112
113

Rose, supra note 4, at 913.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 918–19.
Id.
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likely to improve firm performance attract regulatory
attention.114 In particular, he points to “ineffective” boards of
directors and argues that they enjoy “regulatory
subsidies,”115 while the “effective” market for corporate
control has been hamstrung by “protectionist legislation” and
court decisions that allow target firm managers to thwart the
efforts of hostile bidders and “escape the discipline of a
hostile takeover.”116 Professor Macey’s views are consistent
with the dominant law and economics view articulated by
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel in the
1980s, who advocated managerial passivity in the face of
hostile bids because of what they viewed as the clear benefits
stemming from takeovers.117 Even Professor Rose, who
expresses grave concerns about the potential for
homogenization in corporate governance as a result of
corporate governance ratings, concludes that a potentially
beneficial side effect of the governance ratings industry is its
effect on the market for corporate control, given the
governance industry’s stance against antitakeover devices.118
Here, the empirical evidence is seemingly clear: target
shareholders historically have enjoyed substantial gains
from takeovers.119 This is unsurprising; hostile (and friendly)
bidders have to offer a premium over the current share price
to induce shareholders to sell their shares. The use of
effective antitakeover devices can have two potential effects.
On the one hand, it can reduce the possibility of a successful
takeover, either because the presence of such devices deters
hostile bids or because the use of such devices provides a

MACEY, supra note 14, at 48.
Id. at 49.
116 Id. at 46. Professor Macey points to the Williams Act, passed by
Congress in 1968, and the judicial sanctioning of the use of poison pills by
the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985 as examples of legal impediments to
the market for corporate control. Id. at 122, 123.
117 Fisch, supra note 31, at 940.
118 Rose, supra note 4, at 918.
119 Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and
Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1349 (2013).
114
115
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means for management to defeat hostile bids.120 As a result,
because the threat of a hostile takeover purportedly serves to
discipline
management,
having
defenses
available
diminishes the disciplining effect substantially and removes
the pressure on management to maximize shareholder value,
even in the absence of a pending bid.121 On the other hand,
antitakeover devices have the potential to maximize
shareholder value, as managers can use takeover defenses
either to give them negotiating leverage with a hostile
bidder, leading to higher sale prices, or to ward off bids that
undervalue the target.122 Thus, takeover defenses can be
either value enhancing or value reducing.123
Other than dual-class stock, a structure that is rarely
employed,124 the combination of a poison pill and an
“effective staggered board”125 is the most potent takeover
defense available.126 Poison pills are considered lethal, hence
the name. The significant voting and economic dilution a
hostile bidder suffers by triggering a poison pill (by crossing
a pre-determined threshold of ownership, such as 15%,
without the approval of the target board) serves as a highly
Id. at 1349.
Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1353.
125 An “effective” staggered board is a staggered board whose potency
cannot be diminished by: (1) stockholder ability to dismantle the staggered
board unilaterally and easily by amending the company’s bylaws with a
majority vote, (2) stockholder ability to pack the board with new directors,
thereby creating a new majority, or (3) stockholder ability to remove
directors without cause. Id. at 1353 n.110. In Delaware, the default rule is
that directors on a staggered board may only be removed for cause. See
DEL CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (2014). However, a company’s charter
may provide for removal without cause. A company with such a charter
provision does not have an effective staggered board. See, e.g., the
staggered board of Airgas, Inc. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas,
Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 116 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Airgas’s charter allows for 33% of
the outstanding shares to call a special meeting of the stockholders, and to
remove the entire [classified] board without cause by a vote of 67% of the
outstanding shares.”).
126 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1365–66.
120
121
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effective deterrent for unfriendly takeovers. Corporate
boards can unilaterally (i.e., without shareholder approval)
adopt a poison pill at any time, and many firms wait until a
hostile bid appears before putting a pill in place. A study of
hostile takeover attempts performed by Professors Bebchuk,
John Coates, and Guhan Subramanian revealed that every
target either had a pre-existing pill in place or adopted a pill
once a hostile bid was made.127 Thus, every company has a
“shadow pill.”
It is fair to say, therefore, that the most important
takeover defense is the presence of an effective staggered
board.128 Courts have the power to force a company to
redeem a pill but are unlikely to do so. Indeed, the Delaware
Supreme Court has never ordered a company’s board to
redeem its poison pill. Poison pills, however, can be
redeemed by a board of directors voluntarily. Therefore, as a
practical matter, in order to have the poison pill redeemed, a
hostile suitor must either convince the board to support the
takeover (thus, turning a hostile bid into a friendly deal) or
take control of the board by electing directors, via a proxy
contest, who will vote to redeem the poison pill once they
take office. Proxy contests, however, are a less viable
strategy for hostile bidders facing targets with staggered
boards.
In a classified or staggered board, not all directors are up
for re-election annually. Rather, director terms are
staggered, generally providing for only one-third of the
directors to seek re-election in any given year. Therefore,
even if the hostile bidder could convince the target’s
shareholders to vote in favor of its director nominees, it
would take two election cycles (or as long as two years)
before the hostile bidder could seize control of the target’s
board and have the pill removed. This delay imposes costs
and uncertainty, so it is an unappealing prospect for a hostile
bidder. Staggered boards present a nearly insurmountable
127 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian,
The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, &
Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 926–27 (2002).
128 See Klausner, supra note 119, at 1366.
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hurdle to hostile takeover success. No hostile bid has ever
succeeded in the face of an effective staggered board and a
pill.129 Thus, arguably, no other defensive mechanisms (e.g.,
stockholder inability to call a special meeting or to act via
written consent) matter much at the margin for a firm with
an effective staggered board.130
The evidence on the effect of staggered boards is
seemingly clear. Professors Bebchuk, Coates, and
Subramanian find evidence consistent with the claim that
staggered boards decrease shareholder value. Specifically,
they find that companies with staggered boards are more
likely to remain independent in the face of a takeover
battle131 and that staying independent leads to lower value
for shareholders, relative to those firms that are acquired.132
The researchers also find no statistically significant
difference between the premiums commanded by acquisition
targets with staggered boards and those targets without
staggered boards,133 which casts doubt on the claim that
staggered boards increase target bargaining leverage in a
way that can be value enhancing. The researchers, overall,
find an average loss of share value of 8–10% for firms with
staggered boards.134
Similarly, Professors Bebchuk and Alma Cohen find that
companies with staggered boards have lower firm value than
129 In a study of bids during the five-year period of 1996–2000,
Professors Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian find that no hostile bidder
successfully gained control of a board of a company with an effective
staggered board through winning director elections. Bebchuk et. al., supra
note 127, at 890. They also find that, because threats of a hostile takeover
against an effective staggered board lack credibility given how difficult it
is to seize control of the board, effective staggered boards make it easier
for targets to remain independent. Their study shows that the presence of
an effective staggered board almost doubles the likelihood of remaining
independent from 34% to 61%. Id. at 890–91.
130 For firms without effective staggered boards, these mechanisms, of
course, can have an important effect. Klausner, supra note 119, at 1366.
131 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
132 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1354.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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firms with directors who stand for annual election.135
Professors Cohen and Charles Wang find evidence consistent
with the claim that the relationship between staggered
boards and firm value is a causal one (i.e., staggered boards
lead to reductions in firm value as opposed to the reverse
causal story that firms with low values opt for the protection
afforded by staggered boards).136 Also, consistent with
evidence of staggered boards as “value destroyers,”
Professors Re-Jin Guo, Timothy Kruse, and Tom Nohel find
that announcements of board declassifications yield small
but statistically significant positive abnormal returns.137
There also is extensive empirical evidence that suggests
that other external governance mechanisms are value
enhancing. The G-Index and the E-Index are two leading
measures of managerial entrenchment and vulnerability to
takeover. The G-Index, created by Professors Paul Gompers,
Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, consists of twenty-four
metrics designed to measure the balance of power between
the board and shareholders and the ease by which directors
can be replaced via hostile takeover or proxy contest.138
Professors Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick find that from 1990–
1999 firms with G-Index scores in the lowest decile (those
with the highest exposure to the market for corporate
control) enjoy higher value and better performance than
firms with G-Index scores in the highest decile (those with
the lowest exposure to the market for corporate control).139

Id.
Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards
Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment , J. FIN.
ECON. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3–4), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141410, archived at
http://perma.cc/6XVX-WJA7, cited in Klausner, supra note 119, at 1355.
137 Re-Jin Guo et al., Activism and the Shift to Annual Director
Elections, J. Acct. & Fin. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 20), cited in
Klausner, supra note 119, at 1361.
138 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1363–64.
139 Id. at 1364. More recently, this ability to earn abnormal returns is
disappearing as investors learn how to differentiate between firms that
score well or poorly on governance metrics. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al.,
135
136
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Hundreds of articles using the G-Index as a proxy for
governance quality have appeared in the academic
literature,140 and an analysis of firm differences in
accordance with the G-Index reveals that firms with weaker
shareholder rights have lower profits, sales growth, and
value.141
The E-Index, created by Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Allen Ferrell, consists of six characteristics related to
managerial entrenchment.142 The researchers identified
these six metrics from among the twenty-four metrics in the
G-Index that are associated with firm value as measured by
Tobin’s Q.143 Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell find
that greater board entrenchment, as measured by the EIndex, is associated not only with lower firm values, as
measured by Tobin’s Q,144 but also with lower returns.145
Another study by Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang
finds a relationship between high E-Index (managerial
entrenchment) and lower firm value, profitability, and sales

Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and
Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 324 (2013).
140 A Scopus search reveals that as of November 26, 2014, 1,471
articles have cited the Gompers et al. study. Scopus Search on Gompers
Study, SCOPUS, www.scopus.com/home.url (search “‘Corporate Governance
and Equity Prices’”; then select “Corporate governance and equity prices”
hyperlink by Gompers, Ishii, Metrick). Though this does not mean that all
such articles use the G-Index as a variable in analyses, it is reasonable to
assume that a large number do.
141 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves LongTerm Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1685 (2013).
142 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in
Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 (2009).
143 Id. at 784–785. Elements include staggered boards, limits to
shareholder amendments of the bylaws, supermajority requirements for
mergers and for charter amendments, poison pills, and golden parachutes.
144
Tobin’s Q is defined by the researchers as “the market value
of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of
assets is computed as the book value of assets plus the market value of
common stock less the sum of book value of common stock and balance
sheet deferred taxes.” Id. at 800.
145 Id. at 786.
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growth.146 The E-Index is a popular metric and has been
used in 158 studies since its introduction in 2004.147
Though the G-Index is a widely used metric in academic
research, Professor Michael Klausner argues that the
emphasis on the G-Index is misplaced. As Professor Klausner
points out, only some of the elements of the index can be
used for managerial entrenchment, while others can be used
only in limited circumstances for that purpose.148 Professor
Klausner argues that many elements in the G-Index “have
(1) no impact on management entrenchment, (2) no impact
on entrenchment if a firm has an effective staggered board,
(3) an impact on entrenchment only under limited
circumstances, or (4) no relevance to entrenchment and in
fact affirmatively beneficial impacts on governance.”149 Thus,
the index “contain[s] unnecessary noise” and introduces the
potential for finding a “correlation with no potential
causation.”150
Professor Klausner further argues that the counting of
takeover defenses reflects a pervasive misunderstanding in
the finance literature. More devices does not equal more
entrenchment; thus, counting the number of takeover devices
a company employs provides no information about that firm’s
exposure to the market for corporate control or any other
aspect of the firm’s governance.151 Professor Klausner further
criticizes the G-Index for giving equal weight to all of the
elements in the index, when, if they have any effect on
146 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 139, at 341–43, cited in Bebchuk,
supra note 141, at 1686.
147 Based on articles appearing on SSRN. Links to 158 Studies
Available on SSRN that Use the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Ferrell, 2009), LUCIAN AYRE BEBCHUK, http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/bebchuk/studies.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/E642-C6MG
(last updated Nov. 2014), cited in Klausner, supra note 119, at 1363 n.155.
148 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1363.
149 Id. at 1364. Elements in the G-Index widely seen as beneficial
include: “director indemnification provided for in bylaws, director
indemnification provided by agreement, and protection of outside directors
from monetary liability for violation of the duty of care.” Id. at 1367.
150 Id. at 1363.
151 Id. at 1365.
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entrenchment, they do so at varying levels.152 Given the
empirical support for the relationship between the G-Index
and firm performance, Professor Klausner concedes that the
G-Index must be “measuring something,” but finds it
implausible that the “something” is the level of managerial
entrenchment153 or quality of external governance. He also
argues that the E-Index, another metric that, as noted above,
is widely used in the academic literature, suffers from the
same flaws as the G-Index.
Despite Professor Klausner’s skepticism of the
measures of external governance typically used in academic
studies, the weight of empirical evidence supports the value
of high-quality external governance. However, some scholars
point to the limitations of the market for corporate control
and note that not all takeovers are efficient. The heyday of
the hostile takeover was in the 1980s, as the idea of creating
shareholder value became highly influential in the business
community.154 As Professor Gordon describes, however, the
1980s also saw its share of high-profile hostile takeover
failures, which damaged the credibility of the practice.155
After the 1980s came the realization that hostile takeovers
were a high-cost way to minimize managerial agency costs.156
In addition, there are limits to the effectiveness of the
market for corporate control as a disciplining device. Some
companies are simply too big to buy.157 Other companies are
too small to be worth the effort required of a hostile bid
because takeovers are costly. The need for financing requires
favorable credit market conditions.158 Also, the high
transaction costs associated with hostile bids means that
they are only pursued in situations where there is significant
perceived
managerial
underperformance.159
This
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 1364.
Id.
Gordon, supra note 94, at 1527.
Id.
Id.
Fisch, supra note 31, at 940–42.
Id. at 942.
Gordon, supra note 94, at 1528.
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“lumpiness,” in turn, reduces deterrence.160 Also, hostile
takeovers are likely to occur only if a company appears to be
undervalued. If a firm’s stock price is too high, whether
because of an overheated stock market or accounting fraud,
the market for corporate control offers no solution.161
The market for corporate control also has the potential to
be overinclusive, leading to inefficient takeovers. Specifically,
takeovers have the potential to take advantage of temporary
dips in target share prices, and shareholder collective action
problems can make it difficult for target shareholders to
identify these situations.162 Professors Andrei Shleifer and
Robert Vishny suggest that misvaluation of target firms, not
potential synergy, drives most takeover activity.163
Professors Ming Dong, David Hirshleifer, Scott Richardson,
and Siew Hong Teoh suggest that bidders may expropriate
value from target shareholders either by buying targets for
cash at prices below intrinsic value or by using their
overvalued stock as acquisition currency.164
De-staggering boards, in particular, can be inefficient.
Although moving to annual director elections may better
discipline managers, further exposing them to the market for
corporate control, annual elections could also be adverse to
the interests of large institutional investors.165 For example,
annual director elections are beneficial to activist hedge
funds seeking to replace directors with those sympathetic to
their efforts to, say, initiate a sale of the company to a third
party.166 The short-term focus of some hedge funds, however,
could be at odds with the interests of stockholders with a
long-term perspective.167
One empirical study provides evidence that antitakeover
devices can improve shareholder value. Though takeover
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id.
Fisch, supra note 31, at 942.
Id. at 940–41.
Id. at 941.
Id.
Rose, supra note 4, at 909.
Id.
See id.

DAVIS – FINAL

40

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2015

defenses are generally believed to be value reducing,
Professors William Johnson, Jonathan Karpoff, and Sangho
Yi find evidence that firms with substantial contractual
commitments to customers, suppliers, and strategic partners
commonly go public with takeover defenses, and that these
defenses increase share value.168 For these firms, takeover
defenses can be value enhancing because they provide some
reassurance to the firm’s partners that the company will
maintain these relationships, thereby encouraging those
partners to invest in the relationships.169
Another recent study also calls into question the claim
that classified boards destroy shareholder value.170 Using
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, for the period 1978–2011,
Professors Martijn Cremers, Lubomir Litov, and Simone
Sepe find in the cross-section, consistent with the prior
literature, that firms with staggered boards have lower
values.171 However, they find the opposite result when
viewing the data in the time series (panel data regression),
as board de-staggering is associated with declining value and
moving from annual director elections to a classified board

168 William C. Johnson et al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover
Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms 29 (Sept. 22, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1923667, archived at http://perma.cc/4P2G-7XBM, cited in
Klausner, supra note 119, at 1334–35.
169 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1335.
170 Liz Hoffman, Staggered Boards May Boost Returns: Study, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/
2013/12/11/staggered-boards-may-boost-returns-study/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/2FWV-5J7D (citing K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P.
Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited 3–4
(July
2014)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2364165&download=ye
s, archived at http://perma.cc/38RB-AKRT).
171 K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe,
Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited 4–5 (July 2014) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2364165&download=yes, archived at http://perma.cc/38RBAKRT.
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structure with increasing value.172 To help explain their
novel results, they test the assertion that staggered boards
actually may be advantageous for companies because they
commit shareholders and boards to longer-term horizons. As
support for this hypothesis, their study reveals that the
association between higher firm value and adopting a
staggered board is significantly stronger for firms that: (1)
have higher R&D expenditures; (2) have more patents and
hence are more successful at innovation; (3) have more
intangible assets; and (4) are larger and presumably more
complex.173 Therefore, as the researchers argue, staggered
boards, which can allow for more managerial stability and
continuity, may “offer an ‘institutional memory’” that
prevents rapid changes in a firm’s business strategy in
response to short-term demands from the market.174 The
results of this study are consistent with those of Professors
Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal, and Daniel Taylor—who find
negative stock market reactions following proposals to
eliminate staggered boards175—and consistent with the
literature that suggests classified boards can provide valueId. Employing panel data regression analysis allows the
researchers to control for firm-specific, time-invariant factors that may
affect firm value. Using tools such as firm fixed effects removes any purely
cross-sectional (i.e., across firm) correlation between board type (e.g.,
staggered or unitary board) and firm value, thus greatly reducing the risk
the correlation a researcher finds between those variables is spurious.
Panel data regression analysis with firm-level fixed effects allows a
researcher to answer whether, for any firm in the sample, the firm’s value
increases or decreases as the firm’s board type changes over time. In other
words, in firm-level fixed effects models, the researchers are comparing
changes in board type over time with changes in firm value over time
within individual firms, instead of across firms. The underlying premise
for this analysis is that if the unobserved firm characteristics do not
change over time (i.e., are time-invariant), then any changes the
researchers observe in firm value over the study period are the result of
influences other than (fixed) omitted variables.
173 Id. at 7.
174 Id. at 8.
175 See David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor, The
Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON.
431, 433 (2011).
172
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enhancing continuity and stability.176 This suggests that the
empirical case against staggered boards is not as clear as it
was once thought. That said, despite these findings, most of
the empirical evidence suggests the lack of exposure to the
market for corporate control is value destroying.

III. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE, DATA,
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
A. Research Objective
My objective is to examine the relationship between
institutional ownership and corporate governance in hopes of
yielding meaningful insight about institutional investor
governance preferences. To this end, I employ ordinary least
squares (“OLS”) cross-sectional regression analysis and
pooled OLS regression analysis. Through these analyses, I
will be able to determine how strongly various corporate
governance mechanisms are associated with level of
institutional ownership.

B. Data and Sample
My sample of firms includes all those listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)that had common stock
trading information in the Center for Research in Security
Prices (“CRSP”) database177 for which data was available for
the variables used in this study. My sample size ranges from
618 to 909 firms, depending on specification.
The Thomson Financial institutional holdings database is
the source of institutional ownership data, both overall and
for institutional ownership by type. The Thomson Financial

176 Cremers et al., supra note 171, at 8 (citing STEPHEN A. ROSS,
RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & BRADFORD D. JORDAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
CORPORATE FINANCE (1991)); Richard H. Koppes, Lyle G. Ganske & Charles
T. Haag, Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate over Classified
Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1055 (1999).
177 See Alicia J. Davis, Market Efficiency and the Problem of Retail
Flight, 20 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 36, 59 (2014), for a discussion of sample
construction.
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S34 database provides five classifications of institutional
investors: (1) banks; (2) insurance companies; (3) investment
companies; (4) independent investment advisors; and (5)
corporate (private) pension funds, public pension funds,
university and foundation endowments; and miscellaneous.
However, the S34 database’s type classifications for years
after 1998, per Thomson Financial, are not reliable.
Therefore, I use Professor Brian Bushee’s classifications,
supplemented by my own research when necessary to fill in
missing information, to classify the institutional investors in
this study.178 Professor Bushee divides institutional investors
into eight categories: (1) banks; (2) insurance companies; (3)
investment companies; (4) independent investment advisors;
(5) corporate (private) pension funds; (6) public pension
funds; (7) university and foundation endowments; and (8)
miscellaneous.179 In my analysis, I combine investment
companies and independent investment advisors into one
group––investment companies or “mutual funds”––and
maintain all other Bushee classifications.
Information on stock prices, outstanding shares, and
trading volume is from the CRSP database, and the merged
CRSP-Compustat database is the source of accounting data. I
obtained research coverage and activity data from the First
Call (Thomson Financial) database, and news coverage data
from ProQuest Newsstand articles. Thomson Financial is the
source of industry Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”)
codes. I obtained data on S&P 500 composition from
Compustat’s Index Constituents database.
I obtained Index and Industry CGQs and governance data
from ISS; the E-Index for the years 2002–2006 from

178 I am grateful to Professor Bushee for sharing his classification
database. Institutional Investor Classification Data (1981-2009), WHARTON
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/
bushee/, archived at http://perma.cc/3E2F-ZTFU (last updated July 15,
2010).
179 Institutional Investor Classification Data: Variable Definitions,
WHARTON UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/
faculty/bushee/IIvars.html, archived at http://perma.cc/86XS-S86W (last
updated June 10, 2014).
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Professor Lucian Bebchuk’s website and for years 2007–2010
through calculations derived from information in the
RiskMetrics database; the G-Index for 2002–2007 from the
RiskMetrics database; data on Delaware incorporation from
the RiskMetrics database; and data on total restatement
history and “irregularity” restatement history through June
30, 2006, from Professor Andrew Leones’ website.180
Information on restatements after June 30, 2006, was hand
collected from securities filings (appearing primarily on
Form 8-K) and news reports.

C. Empirical Methodology and Results of Analysis
1. 2010 OLS Regression
My OLS regression analysis uses March 31, 2010, the last
quarter end in which the ISS CGQ was in use, as the date of
interest. The dependent variable in my analysis is
institutional ownership (INSTOWN)181 (calculated as the
number of shares of a firm’s stock held by institutions
divided by the total number of shares outstanding), as of
March 31, 2010. I have seven independent variables of
interest. The first three variables relate to the quality of
See Andy Leone’s Home Page, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI - SCHOOL OF
BUSINESS, http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu, archived at http://perma.cc/
K7LC-TPEQ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (containing link to GAO
Restatement Data).
181 Because of duplicative reporting by institutions on the required
Form 13-Fs (all institutions with $100 million dollars or more in securities
under discretionary management are required to report their holdings to
the SEC each quarter), some firms in the study sample have institutional
ownership percentage values that, as calculated, exceed 100%. Other
researchers find that such instances of duplicative reporting are generally
rare, and, thus, the figures, though anomalous, should not bias this study’s
results significantly. See, e.g., ANJAN V. THAKOR, JEFFREY S. NIELSEN &
DAVID A. GULLEY, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION app. I, at 2. (2005). Also, note that the institutional ownership
variable only represents stock owned by large institutions (that is, those
with $100 million or more in assets under management). Given data
limitations, it is not possible to know precisely what proportion of “noninstitutional ownership” is ownership by individual investors rather than
small institutional investors.
180
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internal governance, either primarily or exclusively. The last
four variables relate to the quality of external governance.
The first independent variable of interest is the March 31,
2010, ISS Index CGQ (INDEXCGQ).182 Historically, ISS used
public disclosures to gather firm-specific data on sixty-one
different factors in eight different categories:183 (1) board of
directors; (2) audit; (3) charter and bylaw provisions; (4)
antitakeover provisions; (5) executive and director
compensation; (6) progressive practices; (7) ownership; and
(8) director education.184 ISS then developed a CGQ for each
company based on scores achieved on these variables by
comparing each firm with the other firms in its peer market
(e.g., the S&P 500, Russell 3000). For example, an S&P 500
company with an Index CGQ of 82 has achieved a higher
governance score than 82% of the firms in the S&P 500.
Thus, firms with the highest scores are considered to have
the highest quality corporate governance. As discussed
previously, though ISS does not reveal publicly the weights
underlying each factor in the final index score, it is
reasonable to conclude that internal governance factors are
more heavily weighted than external governance factors. Six
of the eight categories and forty-one of the sixty-one factors
relate only to internal governance matters: (1) board of
directors (excluding the absence of a staggered board, which
is important in contests for corporate control); (2) audit; (5)
182 CGQ data was first published on September 30, 2002 (outside of
publication in a pilot program on December 31, 2001). As of December 31,
2009, ISS no longer updated the CGQ scores as it transitioned to a new
governance rating scale. However, that new scale was not put into place
until June 2010. Thus, available information from ISS on corporate
governance scores on March 31, 2010, was based on information updated
on December 31, 2009.
183
See infra Appendix A for a list of these factors. Appendix A
contains the pre-2006 factors. CGQ scores before 2006 were based on sixtyone factors. The 2006 CGQ scores were based on sixty-eight factors, and
the 2007–2010 CGQ scores were based on sixty-six factors. infra Appendix
A.
184 Some variables are also evaluated in combination because ISS
believes governance is enhanced by the presence of certain clusters of
governance characteristics and practices.
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executive and director compensation; (6) progressive
practices; (7) ownership; and (8) director education (factors
1–4, 6–21, and 41–61). Also, as discussed in Part II.B, five of
the six most heavily weighted elements in the CGQ relate to
internal governance.
The second independent variable of interest is ISS’
Industry CGQ (INDUSCGQ). The Industry CGQ reflects a
firm’s performance in corporate governance vis-a-vis its
industry peers. Again, higher Industry CGQs imply better
governance.
The third independent variable of interest is a variable I
created that assigns one point for each component of the
INDEXCGQ that is related to what I characterize as internal
governance
(ISSINTERNAL).185
Firms
with
more
purportedly high-quality internal governance mechanisms
have higher ISSINTERNAL scores. Professor Klausner’s
caution on simply counting governance mechanisms186 is
well-taken. However, since I am measuring investor
preferences for particular types of mechanisms and not using
the metric to make claims about the quality of governance, I
believe the use of this variable is appropriate.
The fourth independent variable of interest is the
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell E-Index score (EINDEX). As
described in Part II.C, this popular external governance
metric assigns points to antitakeover defenses used by firms
(e.g., poison pill, classified board).187 A maximum of six points
is available. Under this rating system, firms with the lowest
scores are considered to have the best external governance
structure.
The fifth independent variable of interest is the Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick G-Index score (GINDEX). As described in
Part II.C, this well-known metric assigns points to firms for
each characteristic that reduces the level of “shareholder
rights.” These rights are typically associated with

185
186
187

See infra Appendix B for a list of these components.
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
See infra Appendix C.
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antitakeover provisions.188 Thus, firms with a higher level of
shareholder rights are, under this theory, the most
disciplined because they are the ones that are most exposed
to the market for corporate control. As with the EINDEX,
low scores are purportedly indicative of high-quality external
governance.
The sixth independent variable of interest is a variable I
created that assigns one point for each component of the
INDEXCGQ that is related to what I characterize as external
governance (ISSEXTERNAL).189 Firms with purportedly
high-quality
external
governance
have
higher
ISSEXTERNAL scores.
The seventh independent variable of interest relates to
the presence of a classified or staggered board
(ANNDIRELEC), represented by a dummy variable equal to
1 if the firm has annual director elections (no staggered
board) or 0 if the firm does not have annual director
elections. As discussed in Part II.C, the absence of a
staggered board is generally considered a sign of high-quality
external governance.
I also control for a number of factors that can affect
institutional investor ownership. The first control variable is
Delaware incorporation (DEINC), represented by a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm is incorporated in the state of
Delaware or 0 if the firm is not. There is evidence that
suggests Delaware law is value enhancing.190 Implicit in this
finding is that Delaware law is superior and accords with
sophisticated investor preferences. In addition, in a sample of
California-based firms re-incorporating in Delaware,
Professors Murali Jagannathan and Adam Pritchard find
that incorporation in Delaware is associated with higher
institutional ownership.191 Professors Jagannathan and

See infra Appendix D.
See infra Appendix E for a list of these components.
190 See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J.
FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001).
191 Murali Jagannathan & A.C. Pritchard, Do Delaware CEOs Get
Fired? 21–22 (June 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
188
189
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Pritchard suggest that this finding means that firms
incorporated in Delaware are more likely to attract
institutional investors.192
The second control variable is the incidence of an
accounting restatement due to irregularities (IRRREST) in
the one-year period prior to March 31, 2010, represented by a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has restated its
financial reports because of misconduct during this period or
0 if the firm has not. Professors Karen Hennes, Andrew
Leone, and Brian Miller define a restatement involving an
irregularity as one in which (1) the firm itself describes its
restatement using the words “fraud” or “irregularity,” (2)
there is a related SEC or Department of Justice
investigation, or (3) there is a related independent
investigation (e.g., by an independent forensic accounting
firm). Prior research suggests that the presence of these
factors is indicative of a higher likelihood of misconduct
rather than unintentional errors.193 I employ this control
variable because there is evidence of a relationship between
restatements and institutional ownership. For example,
Professors Natasha Burns, Simi Kedia, and Marc Lipson find
that institutional ownership is positively associated with the
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1313274, archived at
http://perma.cc/Q58U-Z5G5.
192 Id.
193 Professors Hennes, Leone, and Miller acknowledge the possibility
for misclassification (e.g., the possibility that there are irregularities that
firms do not describe as such or for which no SEC or independent
investigation is conducted or the possibility that there are SEC or
independent investigations conducted that conclude no deliberate
misconduct occurred), but assert that they believe such misclassifications
are rare. Karen M. Hennes, Andrew J. Leone & Brian P. Miller, The
Importance of Distinguishing Errors from Irregularities in Restatement
Research: The Case of Restatements and CEO/CFO Turnover, 83 ACCT.
REV. 1487, 1489 (2008), cited in Natasha Burns et al., Institutional
Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence from Financial Reporting, 16 J.
CORP. FIN. 443, 444 (2010). Because, in untabulated results, I use both the
entire population of restatements and the narrowe r subset of irregularity
restatements and get virtually the same results qualitatively, potential
misclassifications are of limited importance to this study’s overall
conclusions.
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likelihood of a firm misreporting its earnings and the
magnitude of the misreporting.194 The researchers attribute
this effect to: (1) the presence of institutional investors with
short investment time horizons that fail to engage in
effective corporate monitoring;195 and (2) managers being
under greater pressure to manage earnings (i.e., smooth
earnings, perhaps to an extent requiring misstatement) to
satisfy demanding, transient investors that will quickly sell
their stock in the face of underperformance.196
Control
variables
furthermore
include
market
capitalization as of March 31, 2010 (SIZE), and average daily
trading volume during the one-year period prior to March 31,
2010 (VOL), because larger, more liquid firms are more likely
to attract institutional shareholder interest.197 I also control
for the influence of research analysts on institutional
investor investment decisions with two variables: (1)
research coverage, defined as the number of analysts that
publish earnings estimates on a firm during the one-year
period prior to March 31, 2010 (RESCOV); and (2) research
activity, defined as the number of published earnings
estimates for a firm during the one-year period prior to
March 31, 2010 (RESACT).
Burns et al., supra note 193, at 444.
Id. The effect is mitigated, however, by ownership concentration by
such institutions. Large ownership stakes provide more incentive to
monitor. Id
196 Id. at 452. Burns et al. also consider, but then dismiss, the
possibility that institutional ownership is positively associated with
restatements because (1) institutions can facilitate the discovery of
financial improprieties leading to restatement announcements, or (2)
institutions are attracted to “momentum” stocks with managers who have
a tendency to engage in aggressive accounting practices. Id. at 454.
197 See Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA.
L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2009) (“Almost all large institutional investors are
confined to making investments in large cap corporations. Either their own
charters or government regulations limit their ability to buy stock in small
companies because of minimum size and maximum ownership
requirements. Moreover, most small cap stocks have thin floats, so any
attempt to buy a significant number of shares in a small cap company
could move the price of that stock higher instantly, making such
investment no longer attractive.”).
194
195
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I control for company diversity (DIVERSE), which I
calculate as the number of industries (determined by fourdigit SIC code) in which the firm operates, because
diversified conglomerates may be less attractive investments
for individual investors due to the greater difficulty in
understanding and valuing the businesses of such firms.
I use firm news coverage (NEWSCOV) as another control
variable because Professors Brad Barber and Terrance
Odean find that retail investors are attracted to attentiongrabbing stocks, which include those with significant press
coverage.198 News coverage data were obtained by hand
counting the number of days during the one-year period prior
to March 31, 2010, on which a firm was featured prominently
(i.e., its name appears either in the headline or lead
paragraph) in a ProQuest news story. Using number of days
of coverage instead of total number of news stories avoids the
counting of virtually identical stories that may appear in the
news on the same day.
I also control for stock price (STKPRC), defined as a
firm’s stock price as of March 31, 2010, because cost concerns
and a desire to achieve diversification with limited
investment funds may lead retail investors to prefer stocks
trading at low absolute levels.199
In addition, I employ a number of controls that may be
related to investor preferences: (1) firm age (AGE), defined as
the number of months the firm has appeared in the CRSP
database as of March 31, 2010, because institutions may
prefer to invest in older, more established firms; (2) stock
volatility (STKVOL), defined as the standard deviation of
monthly stock returns over the one-year period prior to

198 Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, All That Glitters: The Effect of
Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional
Investors, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 785, 788 (2008).
199 See Gustavo Grullon, George Kanatas & James P. Weston,
Advertising, Breadth of Ownership, and Liquidity, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 439,
449 (2004); Ravi Dhar et al., The Impact of Clientele Changes: Evidence
from Stock Splits (Mar. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410104, archived at
http://perma.cc/JUH6-26VV.
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March 31, 2010, because there is evidence that institutional
ownership is associated with higher stock volatility for
dividend-paying stocks and with lower volatility for nondividend payers;200 (3) return on equity (RETONEQ),201
because profitable firms are better able to attract investment
from institutional investors and there is evidence that firms
with higher levels of institutional ownership have higher
return on equity ratios;202 (4) dividends-to-equity
(DIVTOEQ)203 because evidence shows that certain types of
investors, including tax-exempt institutions and individuals
with low marginal tax rates, prefer stocks that pay
dividends;204 (5) a variable related to asset tangibility—the

See Amir Rubin & Daniel R. Smith, Institutional Ownership,
Volatility and Dividends, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 627, 627 (2009) (discussing
the reasons why the relationship between institutional ownership and
volatility differs by dividend payment status).
201 RETONEQ equals earnings divided by book equity. “Earnings” is
income before extraordinary items plus income statement deferred taxes
minus preferred dividends. “Book equity” is stockholders’ equity plus
balance sheet deferred taxes. All accounting-related calculations are as of
the latest twelve months (“LTM”) or most recent available quarter, as of
the quarter prior to March 31, 2010, because that is the financial data that
would have been available to investors as of March 31, 2010. If LTM data
are unavailable for a firm, I substitute the most recent fiscal year’s data.
202 See, e.g., Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., Institutional Investors, Financial
Health, and Equity Valuation, 17 ASIA-PAC. J. ACCT & ECON. 151, 152
(2010).
203 DIVTOEQ equals dividends divided by book equity. “Dividends”
are the dividends per share at the ex date times shares outstanding
divided by book equity, see supra note 201.
204 It should be noted that the evidence on dividend clienteles is
mixed. See John R. Graham & Alok Kumar, Do Dividend Clienteles Exist?
Evidence on Dividend Preferences of Retail Investors, 61 J. FIN. 1305, 1306
(2006), for a discussion of multiple studies finding the presence of an
institutional investor dividend clientele, survey evidence revealing a
perception by financial executives of retail investor preferences for
dividends and less conclusive direct evidence on retail investor dividend
preferences. Graham and Kumar find that, as a group, the retail investors
in their study (which used data from a discount brokerage house’s retail
accounts) appear to prefer non-dividend paying firms, but that within that
group of individual investors, low-income and older investors tend to
prefer stocks that pay dividends. Id. at 1307.
200
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ratio of tangible assets to total assets (TANGASSETS)205—
because there is evidence that institutional ownership is
negatively associated with leverage206 and that firms with
more tangible assets have greater access to external
finance;207 and (6) two variables to proxy for characteristics
indicating high growth opportunities—most recent annual
sales growth (SALESG)208 and the ratio of book value to
market value (BKTOMKT)209—because there is evidence that
firms with high growth potential may be more attractive to
institutional investors.210 The book-to-market ratio also
proxies for firm undervaluation, which can affect not only
institutional investment preferences, but also a firm’s

205 TANGASSETS equals property, plant and equipment (Compustat
Item 7) divided by total assets (Compustat Item 6).
206 Roni Michaely & Christopher Vincent, Do Institutional Investors
Influence Capital Structure Decisions? 4–5 (Jan. 2013) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://home.business.utah.edu/finmh/
Institutional.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2S68-MEX9 (describing the
reasons for the relationship between institutional ownership and debt).
207 This is because the availability of hard assets increases the
amount that can be captured by creditors in case of default. Heitor
Almeida & Murillo Campello, Financial Constraints, Asset Tangibility,
and Corporate Investment, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1429, 1430 (2007).
208 SALESG is the change in net sales from 2008 to 2009 divided by
2008 net sales.
209 BKTOMKT equals book equity, see supra note 201, divided by
market equity (Compustat stock price * Compustat shares outstanding). A
lower book-to-market ratio, which compares book value (accounting value
of net assets) to equity market value, implies higher growth opportunities.
210 Professors Dan Dhaliwal, Oliver Zhen Li, and Hong Xie find that
higher levels of institutional ownership are associated with lower book-tomarket ratios. Dhaliwal et al., supra note 202, at 167. These results are at
odds with those of Professors Paul Gompers and Andrew Metrick who find
that institutional ownership is positively associated with book-to-market
ratio. Dhaliwal et al., supra note 202, at 167 n.5 (citing Paul A. Gompers &
Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q. J. ECON.
229, 244 (2001)). In the present study, in some specifications, consistent
with Professors Gompers and Metrick, I find the relationship between
level of institutional ownership and book-to-market ratio to be positive,
which suggests that firms with high growth opportunities may garner
more attention in the financial press and on investment blogs and thereby
attract more retail, rather than institutional, investor interest.
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vulnerability to hostile takeover.211 The latter has
implications for institutional tolerance of antitakeover
mechanisms.
Finally, I control for membership in the S&P 500 (SP500).
Many mutual funds pursue index fund strategies. Because of
data limitations, I am unable to disentangle the activelymanaged portions of a mutual fund’s holdings from the
indexed portion. Therefore, I control for membership in the
S&P 500 as of March 31, 2010, to avoid spurious
correlations. (See Table 1 for summary data and Table 2 for
pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables used in this
study.)
Following Professors Malcolm Baker and Jeffrey
Wurgler,212 I winsorize the institutional ownership variable
and all the control variables that are not dummy variables at
their 0.5% and 99.5% values as a check against outliers and
influential data points. Regression diagnostics reveal
problems with a number of my variables. To correct for
deficiencies, I express the size, trading volume, research
coverage, research activity, news coverage, age, volatility,
asset tangibility, and stock price variables in natural
logarithms. I also perform principal component analysis to
address multicollinearity problems and subsequently
generate one new variable (SIZEVOLRES) for use in my
regression analyses that combines SIZE (market
capitalization), VOL (trading volume), RESCOV (research
coverage) and RESACT (research activity) into one variable.
I compare institutional ownership levels with seven
different governance metrics. My first regression
specification takes the form:
INSTOWN =  + INDEXCGQi +γ1DEINCi +γ2IRRRESTi
+γ3SIZEVOLRESi +γ4DIVERSEi + γ5NEWSCOVi + γ6AGEi +
γ7STKVOLi + γ8RETONEQi + γ9DIVTOEQi +

211 See 13D Monitor, supra note 211 (discussing how undervaluation
may make a firm vulnerable to hostile takeover).
212 Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Investor Sentiment and the
Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 61 J. FIN. 1645, 1655 (2006).
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γ10TANGASSETSi + γ11STKPRCi + γ12SALESGi +
γ13BKTOMKTi + γ14SP500i + εi
where INSTOWN is the variable representing the proportion
of a firm’s stock held by institutional investors; INDEXCGQ
is the ISS Index CGQ; DEINC is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 for firms incorporated in Delaware and 0
otherwise; IRRREST is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 for firms with a past accounting restatement due
to irregularities and 0 otherwise; SIZEVOLRES is a
combination of market capitalization, trading volume,
research coverage, and research activity; DIVERSE is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms that
operate in more than two industries and 0 otherwise;
NEWSCOV is the number of days of news coverage during
the study period; AGE is firm age; STKVOL represents stock
volatility; RETONEQ is return on equity; DIVTOEQ is
dividends-to-equity; TANGASSETS is the ratio of tangible
assets to total assets; STKPRC is stock price; SALESG is
sales growth; BKTOMKT is book-to-market ratio; and SP500
is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm is a member
of the S&P 500 and 0 otherwise.
In model specification (2), INDUSCGQ, the ISS Industry
CGQ, replaces INDEXCGQ. In model specification (3),
ISSINTERNAL, the components of ISS’ Index CGQ that
relate to internal governance, replaces INDEXCGQ. In model
specification (4), EINDEX, the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
E-Index score, replaces INDEXCGQ. In model specification
(5), GINDEX,213 the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick G-Index
score, replaces INDEXCGQ. In model specification (6),
ISSEXTERNAL, the components of ISS’ Index CGQ that
relate primarily to external governance, replaces
INDEXCGQ. In model specification (7), ANNDIRELEC,
which represents the absence of a staggered board, replaces
INDEXCGQ.
Table 3 reports the results of these regressions, including
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics, and robust standard
G-Index scores are not available after 2007, so the G-Index
regression is as of March 31, 2007.
213
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errors, and shows that governance metrics that are
exclusively or largely internally focused (INDEXCGQ,
INDUSCGQ, and ISSINTERNAL) are positively associated
with institutional ownership. The results are statistically
significant (p-value < 0.01, 0.01, and 0.1 for INDEXCGQ,
INDUSGGQ, and ISSINTERNAL, respectively) and
economically significant.214 A one standard deviation
increase in INDEXCGQ, INDUSCGQ, and ISSINTERNAL is
associated with a 1.6%, 2.2%, and 1.0% increase in
institutional ownership, respectively. An increase in the
quality of governance as measured by INDEXCGQ from the
25th percentile to the 75th percentile is associated with an
increase in institutional ownership of 4.0%.215 A similar
governance quality increase with respect to INDUSCGQ and
ISSINTERNAL is associated with a 5.9% and 4.0% increase
in institutional ownership, respectively.
I also find that ANNDIRELEC (annual director elections)
is associated with higher levels of institutional ownership (pvalue < 0.1). I find no statistically significant relationship
between three measures of external governance—EINDEX,
214 Given the trillions of dollars under management by institutional
investors, even seemingly small percentage changes in institutional
ownership can represent sizable sums. In addition, evidence on reverse
stock splits may prove useful in this context. Firms often do reverse stock
splits to raise a company’s absolute stock price in order to attract
institutional investors. According to one study, in the two-year period
before the initiation of a reverse stock split, institutional investment
declined, on average, by 1.3%. Kee H. Chung & Sean Yang, Reverse Stock
Splits, Institutional Holdings, and Share Value 41 tbl.I (Oct. 1, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1785774, archived at http://perma.cc/XR22-TWFQ.
If a 1.3% decline can induce, at least in part, firms to undergo a reverse
stock split in hopes of attracting institutional investment dollars, then it is
fair to say that a 1.0%–5.9% difference in institutional investment is
economically significant.
215 Consistent with Professors Kee Chung and Hao Zhang, I calculate
this as follows: (OLS Estimated Regression Coefficient on Index CGQ (see
Table 3, column 1) * (75th percentile value of Index CGQ – 25th percentile
value of Index CGQ))/Mean Overall Institutional Ownership of Sample
Firms in Regression Equation. See Chung & Zhang, supra note 16, at 255
n.11.
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GINDEX,
and
ISSEXTERNAL––and
INSTOWN
(institutional ownership). However, this finding (and other
such findings as described below) does not mean no
relationship exists, only that my data do not allow me to
draw any empirically sound conclusions about the nature of
the relationship among these variables.
To assess whether the relationship between institutional
ownership and governance quality varies by institution type,
I perform the regression analyses described above and
replace the dependent variable institutional ownership with
the following: bank ownership; insurance company
ownership; investment company (mutual fund) ownership;
corporate (private) pension fund ownership; public pension
fund ownership; university and foundation endowment
ownership; and other institutional ownership (which
includes hedge funds). Table 4 reports the results of these
regressions, including heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics
and robust standard errors, and shows that higher quality
governance as measured by INDEXCGQ is positively
associated not only with INSTOWN (overall institutional
ownership) (p-value < 0.01), but also with level of mutual
fund ownership (p-value < 0.01) and bank ownership (p-value
< 0.05). However, there is no statistically significant
relationship between INDEXCGQ and any other type of
institutional ownership.
Higher quality governance measured by INDUSCGQ is
positively associated not only with overall institutional
ownership (p-value < 0.01), but also with level of bank
ownership (p-value < 0.05), mutual fund ownership (p-value
< 0.01), and public pension fund ownership (p-value < 0.1).
This suggests that banks, mutual funds, and public pension
funds prefer firms with high-quality, internally focused
corporate governance relative to their industry peers. I find
no statistically significant relationship between INDUSCGQ
and insurance company ownership, corporate pension fund
ownership, university and foundation endowment ownership,
or ownership by other types of institutional investors. Highquality governance as measured by ISSINTERNAL is
positively associated with overall institutional ownership (p-
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value < 0.1) and bank ownership (p-value < 0.1). I find no
statistically significant relationship between ISSINTERNAL
and any other type of institutional ownership. Combined,
these results suggest that the preference for internal
governance mechanisms is shared broadly across institution
types.
The results of the regression analysis for the measures of
external governance differ significantly from those related to
internal governance. Higher levels of ownership by insurance
companies (p-value < 0.05) and public pension funds (p-value
< 0.01) are associated with lower quality external governance
(i.e., lower vulnerability to the market for corporate control),
as measured by GINDEX. (Recall that the lower the
EINDEX and GINDEX, the better the external corporate
governance is assumed to be.) I find no statistically
significant relationship between GINDEX and INSTOWN
(overall institutional ownership), bank ownership, mutual
fund ownership, corporate pension fund ownership,
university and foundation endowment ownership, or other
institutional ownership. I also find a positive relationship (pvalue < 0.05) between bank ownership and EINDEX, again,
a sign of poor quality external governance. Otherwise, I find
no statistically significant relationship between EINDEX or
ISSEXTERNAL and institutional ownership of any other
type. Taken together, these results seem to suggest that, to
the extent there is an institutional preference, it is for
internal governance mechanisms over external governance
mechanisms.
However, I find one area in which there appears to be an
overall institutional preference for high-quality external
corporate governance: annual director elections. Both overall
institutional ownership (p-value < 0.1) and mutual fund
ownership (p-value < 0.05) are associated with higher quality
external governance as measured by the absence of a
staggered board. No statistically significant relationship
exists between ownership by banks, insurance companies,
private pension funds, public pension funds, university and
foundation endowments, or other institutions and the
absence of a staggered board. This suggests that the
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association between overall institutional ownership and the
seeming
preference
for
non-staggered
boards
(ANNDIRELEC) described previously is largely driven by
mutual funds. This is not surprising because mutual fund
ownership is, on average, approximately 45% of the total
ownership of the firms in my sample and dwarfs the
percentage ownership of other types of institutional
investors.
The preceding analysis treats internal governance and
external governance as separate categories of corporate
governance. However, it is possible that internal governance
and external governance are related in such a way that
merits a joint review of the two types of governance devices.
Internal and external governance may be substitutes for one
another (i.e., low-quality governance of one type can be made
up for by high-quality governance of another type). A study
performed by Professors Stuart Gillan, Jay Hartzell, and
Laura Starks provides an example of governance
substitution by showing that firms that are less vulnerable
to takeovers have higher levels of board independence.216
Internal governance and external governance also can
function as complements. Professors Martijn Cremers and
Vinay Nair find that high-quality external governance is
associated with a statistically significant annualized
abnormal return of 10–15% only when coupled with a large
blockholder or high levels of public pension fund ownership,
which the researchers consider indicia of high-quality
internal
governance.217
They
suggest
that
this
complementarity can lead to higher value in at least one
scenario: the presence of a large shareholder can be crucial to
facilitating a successful takeover attempt. This suggests that
firms that lack a large monitoring shareholder may not be
taken over, even if they have no antitakeover devices in
effect.218
216 Stuart L. Gillan, Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, Tradeoffs in
Corporate Governance: Evidence from Board Structures and Charter
Provisions, 1 Q. J. FIN. 667, 668 (2011).
217 Cremers & Nair, supra note 13, at 2862.
218 Id. at 2860.

DAVIS – FINAL

No. 1:1]

QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

59

To test whether internal corporate governance quality
interacts with external governance quality to predict level of
institutional ownership, I perform a regression analysis
using INDEXCGQ; transformed EINDEX variable,
REVEINDEX;219 and INDEXCGQ*REVEINDEX as the
independent variables of interest. Prior to creating a variable
to represent the interaction of INDEXCGQ and
REVEINDEX, I center220 the variables INDEXCGQ and
REVEINDEX by subtracting the sample mean from each
variable’s value. In untabulated results, I find that there is a
positive and statistically significant relationship (p < 0.05)
between
INSTOWN
(institutional
ownership)
and
INDEXCGQ (high-quality (primarily) internal governance),
but no statistically significant relationship between
INSTOWN (institutional ownership) and high-quality
external governance (REVEINDEX) or between the
interaction term INDEXCGQ*REVEINDEX and INSTOWN
(institutional ownership). These results suggest that, from
the perspective of institutional investors, internal and
external corporate governance are not substitutes (e.g., poor
internal governance is fine only if there is strong external
governance) and that the efficacy or attractiveness of
internal governance is not dependent on external governance
or vice-versa.

219 Because of the necessity of generating an interaction term for
INDEXCGQ and EINDEX, I transformed EINDEX to REVEINDEX by
subtracting the value of EINDEX from the number six. Six is the highest
possible EINDEX score, and higher EINDEX scores denote poor external
governance. Because high INDEXCGQ scores indicate good internal
governance, I transformed EINDEX to REVEINDEX so that a higher,
rather than a lower, external governance score also would represent good
governance.
220 REBECCA M. WARNER, APPLIED STATISTICS: FROM BIVARIATE
THROUGH MULTIVARIATE TECHNIQUES 632 (2d. ed. 2013) (“The purpose of
centering is to reduce the correlation between the product [interaction]
term and the X1, X2 scores, so that the effects of the X1 and X2 predictors
are distinguishable from the interaction.”).
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2. Pooled OLS Regression Analysis
As an additional tool to assess the relationship
between corporate governance and institutional ownership, I
perform pooled OLS regression analysis using the period
2002–2010. The 2010 OLS regression analysis affords me an
opportunity to assess whether firms with high-quality
corporate governance have higher levels of institutional
ownership as of a fairly recent single point in time (i.e.,
March 31, 2010). Employing pooled OLS regression analysis,
which uses multiple observations from the same firm over
time, provides an added benefit over the 2010 OLS crosssectional regression analysis because it examines the
relationship between institutional ownership and corporate
governance quality over a multi-year period.
I use annual corporate governance data from 2002, the
year of the launch of the ISS CGQ, to 2010, the year in which
ISS discontinued publication of CGQ’s.221 The dependent
variable is institutional ownership. I compare institutional
ownership levels with seven different governance metrics––
INDEXCGQ, INDUSCGQ, ISSINTERNAL,222 EINDEX,
GINDEX (through the last year of available data, 2007),
ISSEXTERNAL,223 and ANNDIRELEC (no staggered board).
In the pooled OLS regressions, I employ the same control

The precise dates of the data used in the analysis are September
30, 2002, the first date on which CGQ data were published (outside of
publication in a pilot program on December 31, 2001); March 31, 2003;
March 31, 2004; March 31, 2005; March 31, 2006; March 31, 2007; March
31, 2008; March 31, 2009; and March 31, 2010.
222 ISSINTERNAL and ISSEXTERNAL are generated by summing
the number of internal or external governance best practices, respectively,
employed by a firm. The CGQ factors changed slightly in 2006 and then
again in 2007. Thus, to have comparable metrics over the 2002–2010 study
period, I converted ISSINTERNAL and ISSEXTERNAL to percentage
scores (ISSINTERNALPERC and ISSEXTERNALPERC) that reflect the
percentage of ISS-defined best practices employed by each firm in my
sample. Using ISSINTERNALPERC and ISSEXTERNALPERC in place of
ISSINTERNAL and ISSEXTERNAL does not change my results
qualitatively.
223 See supra note 222.
221
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variables, as of the relevant time period, as were used in the
2010 OLS regression analysis.224
In my analysis, I cluster at the firm level. Within a single
regression, assuming no missing data, each firm yields nine
observations (one for each data point in the years 20022010), which leads to clustered errors due to correlation
among observations within each firm. Failure to cluster at
the firm level can lead to incorrect standard errors and
incorrect inferences about the strength of the relationship
between corporate governance and institutional ownership. I
also employ year fixed effects (i.e., I control for factors
occurring in any time period––for example, overall public
pension fund investment in 2007) that could affect
institutional ownership.
Table 5 reports the results of these pooled OLS
regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the firm
level. Consistent with the 2010 OLS analysis, there is a
positive
relationship
between
INSTOWN
(overall
224 All accounting-related calculations are as of the latest twelve
months (“LTM”) or the most recent available quarter, as of the quarter
prior to March 31 of the relevant year, or in the case of 2002, prior to
September 30. If LTM data are unavailable for a firm, I substitute the
most recent fiscal year’s data. Irregularity restatement history is limited
to restatements that occurred post-SOX. I focus on restatements post-SOX
because these restatements may be, in part, a reflection of the internal
control requirements imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. Prentice & Spence,
supra note 79, at 1871. Given the perceived permissiveness of auditing
firms pre-SOX, Professors Prentice and Spence argue that a pre-SOX
restatement is “a sign that management had been busted by its auditor for
stretching numbers beyond all bounds of plausibility.” Id. Post-SOX, with
the heightened focus on financial control, restatements could be perceived
as an example of a company “trying to get [its financial reporting] right.”
Id. Rep. Paul Sarbanes agrees that “[w]hereas before the passage of the
legislation the escalating number of restatements was a danger sign, the
numbers today indicate that the internal control requirements are having
the desired effect.” Paul Sarbanes, Living Up to Its Promise SarbanesOxley Pays Dividends by Keeping Companies Honest, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS (Denver), Apr. 8, 2006, at 2C, cited in Prentice & Spence, supra note
79, at 1871 n.136. Investors seem to make this pre- and post-SOX
distinction, as firm stock prices declined on average 10% following a preSOX restatement, but only 2% following a post-SOX restatement. Prentice
& Spence, supra note 79, at 1871 n.136.
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institutional ownership) and high-quality internal corporate
governance, as measured by INDEXCGQ (p-value < 0.05),
INDUSCGQ (p-value < 0.01), and ISSINTERNAL (p-value <
0.01). The analysis also reveals a statistically significant
positive relationship (p-value < 0.1) between INSTOWN
(overall institutional ownership) and GINDEX. This suggests
an overall institutional preference for low-quality external
governance as measured by the G-Index. I find no
statistically significant relationship between any other
external governance quality measure and overall
institutional ownership.
Table 6 reports the results of pooled OLS regressions that
explore the relationships between corporate governance
metrics and institutional ownership by type of institution.
My analysis reveals that in addition to INSTOWN (overall
institutional ownership) (p-value < 0.01), mutual fund (pvalue < 0.05), bank (p-value < 0.05), and insurance company
(p-value < 0.01) ownership are positively associated with
INDEXCGQ. Similarly, mutual fund (p-value < 0.01), bank
(p-value < 0.01), insurance company (p-value < 0.01), public
pension fund (p-value < 0.01), and other institutional
ownership (p-value < 0.1) have a statistically significant
positive relationship with INDUSCGQ. These results,
combined with the positive relationship I find between
ISSINTERNAL and mutual fund (p-value < 0.1), bank (pvalue < 0.01), insurance company (p-value < 0.01), public
pension fund (p-value < 0.01), and corporate pension fund
ownership (p-value < 0.1), suggest a preference by almost all
institutional investor types for purportedly high-quality
internal governance.
I also find a positive relationship (p-value < 0.1) between
mutual fund ownership and ANNDIRELEC (annual director
elections). This suggests that mutual fund managers are
attracted to firms that do not have staggered boards. This
stands in stark contrast to the negative relationship (p-value
< 0.01) I find between public pension fund ownership and
ANNDIRELEC. Ownership by public pension funds is
associated not only with low-quality external governance in
the form of a staggered board, but also, in the form of higher
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EINDEX (p-value < 0.01), higher GINDEX (p-value < 0.01),
and lower ISSEXTERNAL (p-value < 0.01). The pooled OLS
analysis suggests a preference on the part of public pension
funds for high-quality internal governance and weak
external governance. Ownership by insurance companies and
banks is also associated with low-quality external
governance, as both types of institutional ownership have
negative relationships with ISSEXTERNAL (p-value < 0.05
and < 0.01, respectively) and positive relationships with
EINDEX (p-value < 0.1 and < 0.05, respectively) and
GINDEX (p-value < 0.01 and < 0.05, respectively).
In this study, I have explored the question of institutional
preferences in corporate governance. Though mixed, the
weight of the evidence suggests, overall, that institutions
prefer high-quality internal governance over high-quality
external governance.

3. Causation
The foregoing analysis provides a useful framework for
understanding the relationship
between particular
governance practices and institutional ownership. Even
though the results demonstrate that particular governance
metrics are associated with institutional ownership, given
the econometric technique I use (OLS regression), I can make
no causal claims. However, the evidence presented is
strongly suggestive of the fact that either institutions are
attracted to firms with certain governance characteristics or
the presence of institutional investors leads firms to adopt
such mechanisms – or both.225 Either way, assuming I have
controlled for potentially confounding factors, finding
associations between particular governance metrics and
higher levels of institutional ownership suggests these
metrics generally measure governance characteristics that
are consistent with institutional preferences.
225 Evidence suggests both can be true. See, e.g., Bushee, Carter &
Gerakos, supra note 17, at 4–5 (discussing evidence on institutional
preferences for pre-existing governance characteristics and shareholder
activism).
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IV. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR FINDINGS
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Review of Alternatives
The results of this study suggest that, like Congress,
institutional investors are largely unconcerned with
investing in companies with governance mechanisms
“proven” to enhance firm performance. There are a number
of potential conclusions one could draw about these seeming
preferences.

1. Misinformed or Irrational Investors
This study could demonstrate that institutional investors
are just as misinformed and inept as members of Congress
are alleged to be: institutions have a preference for internal
governance mechanisms because they are holding on to
governance-related “myths” and “superstitions” that bear no
relationship to reality.226 This is certainly possible, but it
seems unlikely. It is standard procedure in the finance and
corporate law literatures to study stock market reactions to
changes in laws or policies—that is, to engage in event
studies.227 Researchers do this because of the prevailing view
that stock price movements following legal changes tell us
something useful about the efficacy of a new law or policy.
During the time of this study, institutional trading in NYSE
226 See supra Part II.B (describing the views of Professor Jeffrey
Sonnenfeld who argues that the factors considered in generating corporate
governance ratings are largely the product of “Wall Street superstitions”
and “clichés and myths, rather than . . . genuine research”).
227 See generally Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder
Proxy Access Damage Share Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?,
64 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2012) (“The three-part mandate of promoting
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, combined with the D.C.
Circuit’s willingness to overturn SEC rules that lack sufficient empirical
foundation, has undoubtedly contributed to the popularity of SEC rules as
targets of empirical study. Stock price event studies have been the most
popular method for commentators considering the effect of events that
alter the probability that proxy access legislation or rules would be
implemented.”).
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stocks represented 98–99% of all trades, so the views of
institutions, not retail traders, are clearly those being sought
by researchers. If researchers routinely attribute significant
meaning to investors’ short-term (sometimes as little as oneday) stock price reactions, which represent short-term
buying and selling following a significant announcement, it
seems reasonable to attribute meaning to institutions’
governance preferences as revealed in the present study.
Relatedly, this study’s results could demonstrate that
institutions are not generally irrational actors, but were
acting irrationally during the study period in reaction to fear
caused by large-scale market scandals. That explanation,
too, seems unlikely. In unreported results for an OLS
regression analysis using data as of March 31, 2005 only, I
generally find the same relationships as those described in
this paper. The year 2005 is three years after the Enron
scandal and three years prior to the financial crisis. Thus,
this is a time period far removed (in Wall Street terms) from
the scandals that could lead to fear-induced preferences.

2. Agendas Unrelated to Wealth Maximization
The preference for governance mechanisms with mixed
empirical support could mean that institutional investors
have an agenda unrelated to maximization of shareholder
welfare. Such charges have been leveled, for example,
against public pension funds. Professor Bainbridge, for
example, attributes the passage of what he views as the
misguided mandate for 100% compensation committee
independence to union and public pension fund advocacy.228
There is no doubt that institutional investors are not a
monolithic group and have varying preferences. However,
the findings in this study, to the extent I find a statistically
significant relationship, are generally consistent across all
institutional types. My pooled OLS analysis shows that not
only public pension funds, but, in general, all institutional
investors
prefer
purportedly
high-quality
internal
governance, despite the fact that the evidence with respect to
228

See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1816.
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efficacy is mixed at best. There is no reason to believe that
all institutional investors, including mutual funds, banks,
and insurance companies, are motivated by political
considerations over return maximization. As I more fully
discuss in Part IV.B.1, infra, shareholders may make the
decision to invest in firms with high-quality internal
governance because they believe in the common sense
intuition that independence from management is helpful in
circumstances such as setting CEO compensation and
auditing financial statements prepared by management. It
may turn out that these investors are wrong, but there is no
evidence to suggest that they are making this choice because
they are indifferent to firm profitability.
Also, there is no evidence that public pension funds are
more likely than other investor types to advocate for
corporate policies that that they believe would depress
returns and be adverse to the financial interests of their
beneficiaries. Indeed, the available evidence shows that
pension funds consistently outperform mutual funds, and
this is after accounting for the different cost structures of the
two types of institutions.229

3. Blind Herding
The relationship between institutional ownership, on the
one hand, and high-quality internal governance and poorquality external governance, on the other hand, simply could
be a reflection of the fact that institutions are lemmings that
blindly follow ISS because investment managers are too lazy
(or feel ill-equipped) to make their own assessments about
After comparing the returns of 716 defined benefit pension plans
and 4,030 mutual funds over the 1992–2004 time period, Professors Rob
Bauer and Rik Frehen find that the “pension funds outperform mutual
funds by approximately 250 basis points per year. After size-matching the
mutual fund sample, differences are reduced to roughly 150 basis points.
Costs are only to a minor extent responsible for the net performance
differential. Risk and style corrections widen the performance gap to more
than 200 basis points.” ROB BAUER & RIK FREHEN, THE PERFORMANCE OF
US PENSION FUNDS 2–3 (2008), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/
show.cgi?fid=78520, archived at http://perma.cc/2RDK-CL69.
229
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governance quality. However, there is evidence against ISSinduced blind herding generally. After examining the
relationship between shareholder votes and voting
recommendations from proxy advisors ISS, Glass Lewis,
Proxy Governance, and Egan Jones, Professors Steve Choi,
Jill Fisch, and Marcel Kahan find that institutional investors
do not blindly follow voting recommendations of proxy
advisors.230 Instead, they find that recommendations from
ISS, the most powerful proxy advisory firm, shift investor
votes by no more than 6–10%.231 This is a material
percentage, but still indicative of less power than
traditionally ascribed to ISS.232 Importantly, Professors Choi,
Fisch and Kahan find that ISS, more than other competing
proxy advisors, bases its recommendations on the
considerations deemed most important by their institutional
investor clients. Thus, the researchers conclude, “ISS is not
so much a Pied Piper followed blindly by institutional
investors as it is an information agent and guide, helping
investors to identify voting decisions that are consistent with
their existing preferences.”233 Just as Professors Choi, Fisch
and Kahan argue with respect to proxy voting, I submit that
perhaps ISS’ governance rating methodology to a large
extent merely reflects the pre-existing preferences of
institutional investors.
My study demonstrates that there is a statistically
significant relationship between mutual fund and public
pension fund ownership, on the one hand, and the ISS Index
CGQ and/or ISS Industry CGQ, on the other hand. Mutual
fund and pension fund managers, as described below in Part
IV.A.4, have reason to follow ISS’ recommendations. That
said, there is still reason to doubt a blind herding
explanation for this study’s findings. According to a 2007
report, Ashton Partners, a strategic advisory firm that
230 Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?,
59 EMORY L.J. 869, 905–06 (2010).
231 Id.
232 Id. Press reports claim that ISS recommendations can shift as
much as 20–30% of shareholder votes. Id. at 905.
233 Id. at 906.
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specializes in communications and investor relations,
surveyed 200 portfolio managers and buy-side analysts.234
Approximately one-third of those surveyed had never even
heard of the ISS CGQ.235 Another third claimed to be aware
of the CGQ236 of the firms in which they were considering
investments, but said the corporate governance rating was
not a factor in their investment decisions.237 It is true that
several years have elapsed since this survey was taken. ISS’
profile certainly has risen since. However, in unreported
results, I find that the positive relationship between
institutional ownership and ISS corporate governance scores
persists each year throughout the 2002–2010 period, which
includes time periods before this survey was administered.
This evidence, though admittedly limited, casts doubt on the
presence of blind herding.
In addition, ISS takes a decidedly negative view of
antitakeover mechanisms, yet the evidence in this study is
clear: higher numbers of antitakeover devices are associated
with higher levels of institutional ownership in many cases.
This, too, is inconsistent with blind herding.

4. Criticism Insurance
Another possible explanation for my finding of a positive
relationship between institutional ownership and internal
corporate governance lies in institutional investors’ use of
ISS ratings as “criticism insurance.” Professor Rose suggests
that ISS’ large amount of influence is related to the fact that
pension funds and mutual funds, pursuant to federal law,
234 FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, RESEARCH ANALYST VIEWS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.foley.com/files/
Publication/d86cd0ab-94ce-4a43-9881-f0beacb1bd9a/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/59dd7bff-8711-4765-9f50-f0fff2fe73ef/Research
AnalystViewsofCorpGov.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WC9N-F8NF.
235 Id.
236 The actual language in the Foley & Lardner release uses the
generic term “corporate governance,” but from the context, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the references are to the CGQ and not to
corporate governance more broadly. See id.
237 Id.
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must vote proxies in the best interests of their investors or
beneficiaries.238 As fiduciaries, pension plan and mutual fund
managers must conduct due diligence in connection with
their proxy voting.239 Following the voting recommendation
of ISS may provide “criticism insurance,” as a fund manager
voting consistent with an ISS recommendation has “no
burden of proof with respect to a particular proxy vote” and
is unlikely to be found to have violated her fiduciary duties
after following the expert advice of a proxy advisory firm.240
One could argue that this also could be the case with
corporate governance ratings.
If this is the case, even if ISS’ governance metric is wrong
about the quality of a particular firm’s governance practices
and investing in such firm leads to investment losses from,
say, fraud, at least an investment manager can take cover by
pointing out that she was one of many institutions with an
investment in the fraudster. Therefore, an investment
manager may perceive the safest course to be one in which
she invests in firms that have received the ISS governance
“stamp of approval.” In other words, investing in ISSsanctioned companies provides a type of “criticism
insurance.”241
This potential explanation, too, seems unlikely. In this
study, I assess the relationship between institutional
ownership and a significant type of governance breakdown––
a firm’s history of accounting restatements due to
“irregularities” (i.e., misconduct) and find, in the 2002–2010
pooled OLS analysis, that higher proportions of institutional
ownership are associated with a higher likelihood of prior
restatements due to irregularities. If institutions’ apparent
preference for internal corporate governance is driven by fear
of fraud, it is puzzling to see a positive relationship between
restatements due to misconduct and institutional ownership.
This result is inconsistent with the assertion that

238
239
240
241

Rose, supra note 4, at 916.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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institutional investors are so frightened by the prospect of
fraud that they would use the ISS rating as criticism
insurance. If investment managers are worried about facing
criticism if a portfolio company were to become involved in
fraud, they would be less likely to invest in firms with a
history of restatements due to irregularities.242 Surely, such
managers would receive as much, if not more, criticism for
investing in a company with a known history of wrongdoing
than for investing in a firm with a comparatively low CGQ
score.

5. Omitted Variable Bias
The relationship I find between governance mechanisms
and institutional ownership could be a product of omitted
variable bias—i.e., my model is missing a factor or factors
related to the choice of governance mechanisms and
institutional ownership. The use of a large number of control
variables informed by finance theory in my analyses goes a
long way toward addressing this concern. However, the
possibility cannot be ruled out completely.

Of course, this finding does not necessarily mean that institutions
actively seek out fraudsters. There are at least two possible alternative
explanations for this result. First, following restatements due to
irregularities, either the CEO or CFO typically (in about 90% of the cases,
according to one study) is removed from office in the short-term. See
Hennes, Leone & Miller, supra note 193, at 1490. Thus, a history of
accounting irregularities does not mean that a firm’s corporate governance
going forward necessarily will be poor. Indeed, governance could
conceivably improve following a management shake-up and the
governance reforms likely to follow shareholder litigation or regulatory
scrutiny, which would make such firms more attractive to institutions.
Second, it is possible that the presence of a large institutional shareholder
base makes firm managers more likely to engage in financial misreporting.
See supra Part III.C.1, for further discussion of this final point.
242
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B. Policy Implications
1. Internal Governance
Because I largely find all of the foregoing alternative
explanations wanting, I am left with the conclusion that
institutional
investors
prefer
internal
governance
mechanisms because they believe, even in the absence of
empirical support, that such mechanisms are value
enhancing. This conclusion is consistent with the history of
institutional influence on governance in the U.S.
As Professor Jeff Gordon notes, from the mid-1980s to the
mid-2000s, the percentage of independent directors on
corporate boards increased substantially,243 not due to
management-initiative, but in response to shareholder
demand.244 Thus, Professor Gordon suggests that the move
from advisory boards to monitoring boards was driven not by
regulatory intervention, but rather by market forces.245
Though it is true, as Professor Macey suggests, that the law
in Delaware has encouraged the use of independent directors
in situations such as evaluating hostile bids and responding
to derivative suits, no Delaware judicial decisions have
required that a majority of a board be independent or that a
board perform only monitoring functions.246 Of course,
Sarbanes-Oxley and stock exchange rules now require board
independence, but these mandates are of fairly recent origin
and largely reflect prevailing corporate norms.247 The most
significant cause of the move to independent monitoring
boards has been the market pressure imposed by
institutional investors.248

243 See Gordon, supra note 94, at 1474 fig.1, 1476. Although
measuring a different time period, it is interesting to note that, in 1950,
independent directors made up about 20% of the membership of a board.
In 2005, that percentage stood at 75%. Id. at 1475.
244 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1358.
245 Fisch, supra note 31, at 930.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
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Prior to the SOX mandate, 70% of public company audit
committees were composed entirely of independent
directors,249 and prior to the Dodd-Frank imposed stock
exchange mandate and previous exchange requirements,
77% of public companies had fully independent compensation
committees.250 Of course, these outcomes cannot be
attributed solely to institutional investor pressure,251 but it
249 This figure is based on a sample of 1,269 public companies. The
Sarbanes-Oxley audit committee independence requirement did not bring
about a drastic change in corporate practice. In 2002, immediately prior to
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, 90% of a sample of public company audit
committee members, on average, were independent, and 70% of the public
companies in this sample had fully independent audit committees. DUGAN
ET AL., supra note 73, at 18–19. Note: these percentages are based on ISS
Governance Research Service’s (“GRS”) definition of independence. This
standard, with limited exceptions, is more stringent than the NYSE
standard for non-affiliation and hence independence. However, there is
substantial overlap, as, in 2005, 93% of directors were characterized
identically as either independent or not independent by the NYSE and
GRS. Id. at 14–15. Stock exchange rules promulgated in 1999 required
listed firms to either have fully independent audit committees or make a
special board determination that it was in the best interest of the company
to have one member (out of three or more total members) be nonindependent. In 2002, 70% of boards in this sample apparently voluntarily
determined it was in the best interest of their firms to have audit
committees made up entirely of independent directors. Indeed, a majority
of public companies (56%) had fully independent audit committees in 1999,
before the effective date of the new stock exchange rules on audit
committee independence. ERNST & YOUNG, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AT 10:
ENHANCING THE RELIABILITY OF FINANCIAL REPORTING AND AUDIT QUALITY 4
fig.
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/The_Sarbanes-Oxley_Act_at_10_-_Enhancing_the_reliability
_of_financial_reporting_and_audit_quality/$FILE/JJ0003.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/E2Y5-52WL. Thus, audit committee independence in the
absence of a regulatory mandate or encouragement was already common
practice.
250 See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 73. This figure is based on a sample
of 1,269 public companies. Id.
251 For example, part of the impetus for compensation committee
independence is likely found in Internal Revenue Code Section
162(m)(4)(C)(i), passed under the 1993 Tax Act, which prohibits deducting
public company employee compensation in excess of $1,000,000 unless the
excess compensation is earned pursuant to the achievement of
performance goals determined by a firm’s compensation committee
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also would be unfair to say that the move toward board
independence was forced upon companies exclusively by
legislative fiat.
The available empirical evidence does suggest that
investors prefer internal governance mechanisms. One study
finds that investors prefer independence and tend to reward
improved corporate governance practices.252 For example, the
appointment of an outside, independent director is associated
with higher follow-on stock prices than the appointment of
an inside director.253 There is also evidence that the market
values both board independence and audit committee
independence. 254 One study finds that investors rewarded
firms that voluntarily adopted these measures before they
were subject to regulatory mandate with higher stock
prices.255 Another study finds that the adoption of several
SOX provisions, including those related to director
independence, resulted in abnormal positive returns for large
and mid-sized companies who did not previously have such
governance characteristics.256
Institutional investors are run by professional managers
who are better equipped than legislators or academics to
understand what is in their institutions’ best interests. As a
firm’s residual claimants, they arguably bear the costs of
poor governance and the implementation of inefficient
governance mechanisms more so than any other corporate
stakeholder. If institutional investors have decided that
high-quality internal governance characteristics are
desirable, then that judgment should be afforded significant
weight in assessing the efficacy of these mechanisms.
This, therefore, leads to a question: Is it fair to refer to
legislative mandates as quackery when the mandates are
composed of two or more outside directors. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i) (2013).
See Jack S. Levin et al., Code Section 162(m) – $1 Million Deduction Limit
on Executive Compensation, 63 TAX NOTES 723, 731 (1994).
252 Prentice & Spence, supra note 79, at 1867.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 1878.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 1879.
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consistent with then-existing practices of 70–80% of public
companies and with institutional investor preferences?
Perhaps it is. Of course, there is no unanimity among
institutional investors or companies about preferred
governance structures. Just because 70–80% of firms have a
certain mechanism, or institutions express a preference for
it, it does not mean that 100% of firms should be forced to
adopt it, even if it is value enhancing for some. There may be
valid reasons for why the other 20–30% have chosen not to
do so, and it is possible that forcing adoption could be value
destroying. However, there may be no valid reason why the
other 20–30% have chosen not to adopt the mechanism, and
employing a particular governance device such as an
independent compensation committee or an audit committee
might truly be a best practice. It certainly seems prudent to
prohibit those whose livelihood or income is determined by a
company’s executive officers from deciding the compensation
of those executives or reviewing the financial reporting
decisions of those officers. Indeed, within the universe of
mandates Congress could have imposed (and did impose,
such as the 404 internal control certification requirement in
Sarbanes-Oxley), requiring any inside and affiliated directors
to be removed from audit and compensation committees and
replaced by independent, outside directors is relatively
inexpensive. Though the practice of fully independent audit
and compensation committees was not universal prior to the
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and stock exchange mandates,
the practice was sufficiently widespread and consistent with
the preferences of institutional investors, the purported
protected class, that Congress could have reasonably
concluded that blanket mandates in these areas were more
cost-effective than allowing firms to make individualized
determinations with respect to mechanism efficacy.257
In light of these factors, I offer the following. In the
corporate governance area, there are a number of
contradictory empirical findings with respect to device
257 There is no evidence that this is what Congress did. Here, I merely
suggest that it would not be unreasonable for Congress to reach this
conclusion.
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efficacy, and this trend shows no signs of abating. Even if
Congress had carefully reviewed the empirical evidence
before passing the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank
governance mandates, what should have been the outcome
following that review? Should Congress have declined to act
in the absence of clear evidence?
Today, we are relatively far removed from the crises that
plagued the nation before the passing of SOX and DoddFrank, but, unfortunately, we still do not have a consensus
on what works in internal corporate governance some
thirteen years after the passage of SOX and five years after
the passage of Dodd-Frank. If the critics’ argument is that
Congress should not act in the absence of clear empirical
evidence, then this necessarily means that regulators will
not take action until a consensus on what works in corporate
governance emerges. Dispensing with all mandates and
leaving it to the market to decide is the goal of some, for
sure. However, to the extent one believes that capital
markets failure exists and that regulation to rein in
managerial overreaching is necessary, then a norm that
requires waiting for an academic consensus before acting is
deeply unsatisfying. In this Article, I make the modest claim
that, if one must act in the face of uncertainty, it would be
beneficial to adopt a more expansive concept of “valid”
empirical evidence that includes institutional investor
preferences.

2. External Governance
Though I find some evidence of a mutual fund preference
for annual director elections, the results of this study suggest
that there is a high level of institutional tolerance (and, in
some cases, a seeming preference) for investing in firms with
low levels of takeover vulnerability. For example, in this
study, I find a statistically significant relationship between
public pension fund ownership and low-quality external
governance, including the presence of a staggered board.
These results may strike some as puzzling because many
institutional investors, particularly public pension funds, are
vocal opponents of antitakeover devices such as poison pills

DAVIS – FINAL

76

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2015

and staggered boards. However, this outcome is consistent
with researcher Brandon Gold’s findings that suggest
institutional investor “hypocrisy” when it comes to
antitakeover mechanisms.258
Over the past decade, pension funds and mutual funds
have increasingly come out publicly in opposition to
antitakeover devices, particularly staggered boards.259 For
example, the five largest mutual funds, the Council of
Institutional Investors, and the largest public pension funds
have adopted formal policies to support annual director
elections and oppose classified boards.260 In addition, as
Professor Bebchuk notes, institutional investors, if assessed
by voting record, firmly support director accountability and
de-staggering of boards.261 He points to the voting decisions
of institutional investors in the past three years and notes
that shareholder proposals for S&P 500 company board
declassification have received, on average, more than 75% of
the votes cast in favor.262 This fact must point to, Professor
Bebchuk argues, the widespread belief among institutional
investors that devices like staggered boards that facilitate
management entrenchment are likely to be value decreasing,
not value enhancing over the long term.263 This institutional
support is not just from investors with generally short
investment time horizons, Professor Bebchuk notes, but also
from public pension funds (e.g., CalPERS, TIAA-CREF),
investors with long-term horizons because of their need to
use investments to meet long-term retirement obligations, as
well as from private investment managers such as
Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street that focus on
providing mutual funds that focus on passive, long-term
investments.264 Professor Bebchuk goes on to argue that this
consistent pattern of institutional investor support should
258
259
260
261
262
263
264

See Gold, supra note 24, at 56.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 8–9.
Bebchuk, supra note 141, at 1681.
Id. at 1681–82.
Id. at 1681.
Id. at 1682.
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give those who favor board insulation techniques such as
staggered boards pause, as they should be reluctant to assert
that they know what is in the long-term interests of
investors better than the investors do.265
This de-staggering trend has occurred in the wake of
shareholder activism, which often takes the form of
shareholder proposals to de-classify boards.266 Many public
companies consequently have de-staggered their boards:
approximately sixty companies per year de-staggered their
boards from 2003 to 2010, a substantial increase from the
average of four firms per year de-staggering between 1987
and 2002.267 From 2000 to 2012, the number of S&P 500
companies with classified boards declined by more than
40%.268 In the 2012 proxy season alone, the Harvard
Shareholder Rights Project submitted shareholder proposals
that led to declassification of one-third of the staggered
boards in the S&P 500.269 On average, 99% of the votes cast
with respect to these proposals were in favor of
declassification, which seems to suggest robust investor
opposition to staggered boards.270 Moreover, firms that were
subject to declassification proposals de-staggered their
boards more frequently than firms that were not the targets
of such proposals.271 The de-staggering trend has been helped
by the presumption of ISS support for such proposals.272
Institutional investors’ public opposition to low-quality
external governance and the subsequent board de-staggering
trend are at odds with the available evidence on IPO charter
governance provisions. Charters of IPO firms generally are
devoid of governance innovations, as companies typically
adopt the default provisions of the corporate codes of their
Id. at 1683.
Gold, supra note 24, at 1.
267 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1360.
268 Gold, supra note 24, at 9.
269 Id. at 9–10.
270 Id at 10.
271 Klausner, supra note 119, at 1360.
272 Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. Corp. L. 887,
909 (2007).
265
266
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states of incorporation.273 However, staggered boards are an
exception.274 Despite the vocal opposition to antitakeover
devices and the recent success of declassification efforts,
most companies that go public have a staggered board in
place.275 According to one report, as many as 86% of IPO
firms (i.e., firms going public) have staggered boards in
place.276 Another study of firms that went public between
1997 and 2005 revealed that approximately 64% of them had
staggered board provisions in their charters.277 Similarly, in
a review of the governance characteristics of firms at the
time of IPO for the one hundred largest IPO’s in the U.S.
between September 2011 and October 2013, Davis Polk
found that these firms had purportedly low-quality external
governance.278 For example, among the forty-six noncontrolled firms, 70% had staggered boards and required a
supermajority vote for amending bylaws, 78% prohibited
stockholders from acting by written consent, and 98%
authorized blank check preferred stock (which makes it
easier for a board to unilaterally put in a poison pill).279
Despite the pressure from some shareholder groups and
proxy advisory firms to modify governance practices,
governance attributes seem to have no meaningful impact on
the willingness of investors to participate in the offering at
the IPO stage.280 Indeed, Davis Polk asserts that “IPO
Klausner, supra note 119, at 1329.
Id.
275 Gold, supra note 24, at 1.
276 Id. at 10.
277 E-mail from William C. Johnson, Assistant Professor, Sawyer Sch.
of Bus., Suffolk Univ., to Michael Klausner, Professor, Stanford Law Sch.
(Jan. 11, 2013), cited in Klausner, supra note 119, at 1333 n.29 (confirming
the aggregated percentage of all IPO firms with staggered boards based on
their dataset). See also Johnson et al., supra note 168.
278 See Richard J. Sandler, Governance Practices for IPO Companies:
A Davis Polk Survey, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Feb. 3, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/03/
governance-practices-for-ipo-companies-a-davis-polk-survey/, archived at
http://perma.cc/SC5F-KJCJ.
279 Id.
280 Id.
273
274
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companies can continue to tailor their governance practices
to fit their individual preferences.”281
Researcher Brandon Gold notes that public pension funds
are among the most vocal opponents of antitakeover devices,
yet they quietly invest in companies at the IPO stage that
have all the devices they publicly disparage. Issuers with
mutual funds and pension funds, which are among the most
vocal critics of staggered boards, as significant pre-IPO
shareholders have the strongest takeover defenses in place
when they go public.282 Gold attributes this inconsistency
potentially to the separation of voting and investing
functions in large institutional investors283: non-portfolio
management personnel (members of the “corporate
governance” department) are often responsible for voting
decisions and have no input on the investment decisions of
the portfolio managers.284 Moreover, for those institutions
that rely heavily on ISS recommendations for voting, there is
no coordination whatsoever between ISS (the source of the
proxy voting recommendations) and the investment
personnel.285
Whereas Gold finds this effect with respect to IPO firms, I
find that it applies to investments in mature companies as
well. Using a data set of mature NYSE-traded companies, I
find, consistent with expectations, that mutual fund
ownership is associated with annual director elections.
However, public pension fund ownership is not. The pooled
OLS analysis reveals that public pension funds do not
eschew investments in companies with staggered boards.
Indeed, the presence of a staggered board is associated with
higher levels of public pension fund ownership. Thus, it
appears that pension funds have relatively high levels of
investment in firms with classified boards, despite their
public protestations against the device.

281
282
283
284
285

Id.
Gold, supra note 24, at 2.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.
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Some of the previously listed examples of institutional
activism occurred after my study period ended in 2010, but
there is no reason to believe that the disconnect between
public opposition to staggered boards and investment choice
stems only from a change in time period. The dawn of public
pension fund activism was in 1985 with the creation of the
Council of Institutional Investors, an institution devoted to
fostering collective advocacy for shareholder rights.286
Activist investors have advocated for the removal of poison
pills via shareholder proposal submission since 1987,287 and
their efforts continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s when
investors sought broader improvements in external and
internal governance. Activism in the early 2000s seemed to
gain immense traction in the post-Enron era, when
management seemed less willing to fight activist efforts
because of the high cost of ignoring shareholder demands.288
According to one study of a sample of 620 non-binding
governance-related shareholder proposals, boards acted upon
only 16% of shareholder proposals receiving majority
shareholder vote in 1997; that percentage stood at 40% in
2004.289 For antitakeover device removal proposals, the
respective percentages were 18.6% and 40.2%.290 In addition,
increasing numbers of antitakeover device shareholder
proposals that received majority shareholder support in
2002-2004 led many firms to remove their poison pills and

286 Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder
Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 56 (2007).
287 See SHARON MARCIL & PEG O'HARA, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY
RESEARCH CENTER, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1987 PROXY SEASON 5 (1987).
288 See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of
Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder
Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 64 (2010).
289 Id. at 54, 58 tbl.1.
290 Id. at 58 tbl.1 (showing that 18.6% represents the rate of
implementation of majority approved shareholder proposals from 1997–
2001, and 40.2% represents the rate from 2002–2004).
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de-stagger their boards.291 Consequently, shareholder
activism is by no means a post-2010 phenomenon.
One potential explanation for the “hypocrisy” we see
among public pension funds may simply reflect the difficulty
such investors face in divesting stocks of firms employing
antitakeover devices. One pension fund corporate governance
director I interviewed said s/he had never heard of a pension
fund selling a stock on the basis of corporate governance
alone.292 Stocks are sold on account of poor financial
performance because pension fund managers are trying to
maximize returns on behalf of their pension beneficiaries.
However, even if financial analysis does not suggest that a
stock should be sold, a manager may still comply with her
fiduciary duties and sell the stock so long as the sale does not
negatively affect the portfolio.293 The manager needs to be

291 Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in
the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market
Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 369 (2007).
292 Interview with anonymous pension fund corporate governance
director (July 3, 2014).
293 See, e.g., PUB. HEALTH INST. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL CTR.,
EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS AND ENDOWMENTS LEGAL STANDARDS FOR
TOBACCO
DIVESTMENT
2
n.3
(2001),
http://www.bhopal.net/old
_studentsforbhopal_org/Assets/LegalDivestment.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/UQA2-3X98 (quoting Memorandum from Ian D. Lanoff to
the Cal. State Teachers Ret. Sys.’ Inv. Comm., Regarding Points
Concerning Investment and Divestment of Plan Assets in Conformity with
Fiduciary Principles (Mar. 24, 2000)).

If the analysis whether it is prudent to invest in or hold a
security yields an uncertain or positive result, a fiduciary
may lawfully sell the security if it is not imprudent to do
so. Under such circumstances, a fiduciary may lawfully
choose to divest, provided that a financial and economic
analysis performed by investment professionals uncovers a
number of potential investment opportunities that are
ostensibly equally advantageous from an economic
perspective. In this way a fiduciary may lawfully
implement the divestment plan because it satisfies
fiduciary requirements of loyalty to plan participants . . .
and prudence.
Id.
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able to replace the divested stock with a comparable security
that is “equally advantageous from an economic perspective”
so that the plan upholds its duty of loyalty to plan
participants.294 It is much easier to divest a company’s stock
due, say, to politically controversial business relationships
than it is to divest a stock because it has a staggered board—
staggered boards are simply too prevalent. Almost 12% of the
firms in the S&P 500,295 40% of the S&P 1500296 and 48% of
the firms in my sample have classified boards. Even if a
manager feels strongly about the absence of staggered boards
as a matter of principle, unless she can tie the presence of
staggered boards to poor financial performance in her
portfolio, full-scale divestment of companies with staggered
boards would be quite difficult.297
The foregoing provides a potential explanation for why
pension funds do not divest the stocks of companies with
staggered boards. What it does not explain is why there is a
correlation between presence of a staggered board and higher
levels of public pension fund ownership. The reason for this
may be related to higher expected long-term performance of
firms with staggered boards. Recall that Professors Cremers,
Litov, and Sepe find an association between staggered boards
and higher long-term firm value,298 so investing in firms with
staggered boards could be a rational investment choice.
Relatedly, public pension funds’ apparent preference for
firms that employ antitakeover devices may also reflect the
Id.
See Hoffman, supra note 170.
296 Becky Yerak, Staggered Boards: Public Companies’ Directors the
Centerpiece of a Tug of War, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-04/business/ct-biz-0401-bfstaggered-boards-20120401_1_board-structure-board-members-boardterms, archived at http://perma.cc/7LUZ-EDV6.
297 It is interesting to note that when pension fund corporate
governance professionals take on issues surrounding corporate
governance, they typically do not use the threat of selling their stock as
leverage against corporate management. Instead, they use other means of
shareholder action such as voting against management on key proposals
(e.g., say-on-pay).
298 See supra notes 171–174 and accompanying text.
294
295
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belief that high-quality external governance is costly. As
discussed above, many internal governance improvements
(e.g., replacing inside directors with outside directors) are
relatively inexpensive. So, too, is improving external
governance (e.g., de-staggering a board) for those firms that
are not particularly vulnerable to takeovers. However, for
those companies that are vulnerable to hostile activity (e.g.,
those that are undervalued relative to peers, have excess
cash or debt capacity, have a shareholder base likely to
support an unfriendly bid,299 are not too small to be worth
the expense of a hostile bid300 but not so large as to make
acquisition infeasible,301 and have viable potential bidders
that could achieve synergies through a business
combination),302 de-staggering the board has the potential to
be game-changing. Reasonable people can and do disagree
about when and under what circumstances companies should
allow themselves to be open to hostile attack. This study
suggests that institutional investors, as a group, are quite
comfortable with antitakeover devices, perhaps because
these defenses can protect portfolio companies against
opportunistic takeover attempts that take advantage of, for
example, temporary stock price declines.303 This scenario is

See 13D Monitor, supra note 211.
See, e.g., In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171,
178–79 (Del. Ch. 2007).
301 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1151 (Del. 1989).
302 See Michal Barzuza, Noise Adopters in Corporate Governance, 2013
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 627, 640–41 (2013).
303 See, e.g., Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48,
86 (Del. Ch. 2011). Air Products waged a 16-month hostile campaign to
acquire Airgas, but ultimately failed in its attempts to remove Airgas’
antitakeover devices. The Airgas board insisted that Air Products was
undervaluing Airgas and attributed Airgas’ recent share price drop to the
poor economy. Within less than a year of Air Products dropping its bid, the
Airgas stock price exceeded Air Product’s “best and final offer” of $70. See
Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=
ARG&a=00&b=17&c=2012&d=00&e=17&f=2012&g=d,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/G49H-EHLL (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). As of March 23,
2015, Airgas was trading at $105.31. ARG: Summary for Airgas, Inc.
299
300
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likely to be particularly true with respect to companies at the
time they go public.304
What is clear is that there is a positive relationship
between public pension fund ownership and the presence of
antitakeover devices. Given this fact, I submit that before we
criticize legislators or courts for impeding the market for
corporate control by making it easier for boards to resist
hostile activity and going against the weight of empirical
evidence when doing so, one might want to consider the role
that institutional investor preferences play in the
perpetuation of antitakeover devices. Despite the claim by
many academic researchers that exposure to the market for
corporate control is an unequivocal good, many institutional
investors, based on their ownership stakes, appear to have a
different or at least a more nuanced view.

V. CONCLUSION
This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal
corporate governance is associated with higher levels of
ownership by institutional investors. This finding is
consistent with the idea that institutions have greater
reasons than individual investors to prefer well-governed
firms, but somewhat surprising given the decidedly mixed
empirical evidence on the efficacy of internal governance
mechanisms. The study also finds that higher quality
external governance is associated, in many cases, with lower
proportions of ownership by institutional investors. This
discovery also is a surprising result given empirical evidence
on the positive relationship between external governance and
Common Stock, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=ARG,
archived at http://perma.cc/YYN6-VSAT (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
304 In an interview with a director of corporate governance at a
pension fund, I learned that the issue of staggered boards at the time of
the IPO was raised at an institutional investor conference s/he attended
recently. The emerging consensus in the room, I am told, was that there is
some virtue in giving relatively young companies the space to grow and
develop without risk of an ill-timed and opportunistic hostile takeover.
Interview with anonymous pension fund corporate governance director,
supra note 292.
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firm performance. After largely dismissing competing
explanations for these findings, I conclude that institutional
investors simply prefer internal governance mechanisms and,
at a minimum, tolerate and may even prefer purportedly
low-quality external governance. I further make the rather
modest suggestion that when debating the efficacy of
governance mechanisms, the preferences of informed,
sophisticated investors be afforded greater weight than is
currently the case.
When accepting the Nobel Prize for Economics, Professor
Bob Solow remarked:
[Economists] should try very hard to be scientiﬁc
with a small s. By that I mean only that we should
think logically and respect fact. . . . Now, I want to
say something about fact. The austere view is that
“facts” are just time series of prices and quantities.
The rest is all hypothesis testing. I have seen a lot of
those tests. They are almost never convincing,
primarily because one senses that they have very low
power against lots of alternatives. There are too
many ways to explain a bunch of time series. . . . My
hunch is that we can make progress only by
enlarging the class of eligible facts to include, say,
the opinions and casual generalizations of experts
and market participants, attitudinal surveys,
institutional regularities, even our own judgments of
plausibility.305

These words of wisdom can be applied in the context of
empirical research surrounding corporate governance.
Setting corporate law policy is unquestionably a difficult
endeavor, as there are hundreds of studies reaching
inconsistent conclusions about what “works” in corporate
governance. “Enlarging the class of eligible facts” to include
the reasoned preferences of the protected class may allow us

305 ROBERT SOLOW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES 168–69 (William Breit &
Barry T. Hirsch eds., 5th ed. 2009), cited in Stephen T. Ziliak & Deirdre N.
McCloskey, Size Matters: The Standard Error of Regressions in the
American Economic Review, 33 J. SOCIO-ECON. 527, 544 (2004).
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to move closer to making the progress of which Professor
Solow speaks.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS306
Dependent
Variables
Overall
Institutional
Ownership

Bank
Ownership

Overall
0.705

Between

Within

Mean
Std. Dev.

0.232

0.198

0.126

Minimum

0.000

0.003

-0.105

Maximum

2.973

1.631

3.124

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,801

1,470

8.028

Std. Dev.

0.081

0.063

0.052

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.148

Maximum

2.133

0.712

1.947

Observations/
T-bar

11,803

1,470

8.029

0.167

306 Table 1 reports summary data on the variables used in the
analysis of the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate
governance. Higher values of “ISS INDEX CGQ,” “ISS INDUSTRY CGQ,”
and “ISS INTERNAL GOVERNANCE SCORE” reflect higher quality
(primarily or exclusively) internal governance (e.g., board independence).
Higher values of “E-INDEX” and “G-INDEX” reflect lower quality external
governance (i.e., less exposure to the market for corporate control). Lower
values of “ISS EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE SCORE” represent lower
quality external governance. “ANNUAL DIRECTOR ELECTIONS (i.e., no
staggered board)” is a measure of high-quality external governance.
“Observations” in the “Overall” column represents the total number of
firm-years in the panel. “Observations” in the “Between” column
represents the number of firms. “T-bar” figures in the “Within” column
represent the average number of years a firm was observed in the
applicable variable category. The “Minimums” and “Maximums” reported
under the “Overall” column represent the range of values for the overall
sample. Those reported under the “Between” column represent the range
of values across firms. The “Minimums” and “Maximums” reported under
the “Within” column represent the range of deviations from each
individual firm’s average for the applicable variable, which may result in
negative values.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONT.)
Dependent
Variables
Insurance
Company
Ownership

Mutual
Fund
Ownership

Corporate
Pension
Fund
Ownership

Public
Pension
Fund
Ownership

University/
Foundation
Endowment
Ownership

Overall

Between

Within

Mean

0.038

Std. Dev.

0.041

0.034

0.024

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.452

Maximum

0.695

0.646

0.305

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,803

1,470

8.029

Std. Dev.

0.177

0.150

0.096

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.180

Maximum

1.588

1.063

1.256

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,803

1,470

8.029

Std. Dev.

0.033

0.030

0.012

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.259

Maximum

0.913

0.902

0.442

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,803

1,470

8.029

Std. Dev.

0.015

0.012

0.009

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.050

Maximum

0.188

0.162

0.148

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,803

1,470

8.029

Std. Dev.

0.007

0.005

0.005

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.063

Maximum

0.149

0.131

0.100

Observations/
T-bar

11,803

1,470

8.029

0.452

0.007

0.025

0.002
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONT.)
Dependent
Variables
Other
Institutional
Ownership

Independent
Variables
of Interest
ISS
Index
CGQ

ISS
Industry
CGQ

ISS
Internal

E-Index

Overall

Between

Within

Mean

0.029

Std. Dev.

0.037

0.025

0.027

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.180

Maximum

0.729

0.251

0.673

Observations/
T-bar

11,803

1,470

8.029

Overall

Between

Within

Mean

56.651

Std. Dev.

28.398

21.544

18.681

Minimum

0.100

1.739

-23.935

Maximum

100.000

99.182

122.091

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

10,437

1,348

7.743

Std. Dev.

24.705

19.293

15.880

Minimum

0.170

3.743

-8.861

Maximum

100.000

99.138

130.762

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

10,437

1,348

7.743

Std. Dev.

7.185

2.691

6.714

Minimum

4.000

11.000

-0.238

Maximum

39.000

31.000

36.429

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

10,437

1,348

7.743

Std. Dev.

1.227

1.022

0.732

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.764

Maximum

6.000

6.000

5.861

Observations/
T-bar

8,080

1,210

6.678

70.006

22.762

2.736
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONT.)
Independent
Variables
of Interest
G-Index

ISS
External

Annual
Director
Elections

Control
Variables
Delaware
Incorp.

Irregularity
Restatement
History

Overall

Between

Within

Mean

9.437

Std. Dev.

2.568

2.533

0.424

Minimum

2.000

2.000

4.771

Maximum

18.000

18.000

12.437

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

5,991

1,143

5.241

Std. Dev.

2.8810

2.072

2.023

Minimum

0.000

1.667

-2.301

Maximum

16.000

14.000

14.240

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

10,437

1,348

7.743

Std. Dev.

0.497

0.468

0.169

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.445

Maximum

1.000

1.000

1.333

Observations/
T-bar

10,803

1,348

8.014

Overall

Between

Within

7.574

0.444

Mean

0.559

Std. Dev.

0.497

0.492

0.064

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.219

Maximum

1.000

1.000

1.226

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

9,158

1,210

7.569

Std. Dev.

0.107

0.049

0.097

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.655

Maximum

1.000

0.667

0.900

Observations/
T-bar

11,804

1,470

8.030

0.012

DAVIS – FINAL

No. 1:1]

QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

91

TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONT.)
Control
Variables
Market
Capitalization
(mean, min,
max in
millions)

Average
Daily
Trading
Volume

Research
Coverage
(number of
analysts
covering at a
point in time)

Research
Activity
(number of
earnings
estimates
published in
a year)
Industry
Diversity
(1 = operates
in more than
two
industries)

News
Story
Mentions

Overall

Between

Within

Mean

8,033.458

Std. Dev.

23,401.94

21,240.95

7,357.087

Minimum

1.756

5.910

-186,458.800

Maximum

452,505.300

343,599.000

145,098.700

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,800

1,470

8.02721

Std. Dev.

7,064,189.000

4,304,473.000

5,522,876.000

Minimum

3,313.834

11,652.060

-81,800,000.000

Maximum

499,000,000.000 96,400,000.000

404,000,000.000

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,751

1,469

7.999

Std. Dev.

6.808

6.318

2.501

Minimum

1.000

1.000

-14.444

Maximum

42.000

32.556

27.356

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,217

1,445

7.7626

Std. Dev.

300.923

266.942

130.130

Minimum

1.000

2.000

-565.565

Maximum

2,533.000

1,842.222

1,478.560

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,327

1,445

7.839

Std. Dev.

0.494

0.495

0.000

Minimum

0.000

0.000

0.580

Maximum

1.000

1.000

0.580

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

10,751

1,318

8.157

Std. Dev.

525.034

469.512

201.466

Minimum

0.000

0.111

-4,162.108

Maximum

17,241

9,237.667

8,176.892

Observations/
T-bar

11,799

1,469

8.032

1,710,659.000

9.356

314.685

0.580

173.559
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONT.)
Control
Variables
Age
(in months)

Volatility
(standard
deviation of
monthly
returns)

Return-onequity
(in integers)

Dividendsto-equity
(in integers)

Tangible
Assets-toTotal Assets
(in integers)

Overall

Between

Within

Mean

296.577

Std. Dev.

242.058

238.512

28.0876

Minimum

0.000

2.000

250.827

Maximum

1,011.000

969.000

352.291

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,779

1,470

8.013

Std. Dev.

0.071

0.039

0.060

Minimum

0.007

0.032

-0.091

Maximum

1.039

0.265

0.961

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

11,722

1,469

7.980

Std. Dev.

2.829

0.978

2.644

Minimum

-43.475

-5.203

-38.123

Maximum

225.581

28.345

197.385

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

8,981

1,197

7.503

Std. Dev.

0.748

0.276

0.696

Minimum

-23.483

-1.936

-21.494

Maximum

38.690

6.003

33.907

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

7,323

1,174

6.238

Std. Dev.

25.450

24.583

6.826

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-48.485

Maximum

99.788

92.901

67.415

Observations/
T-bar

9,151

1,115

8.207

0.103

0.149

0.053

29.280
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONT.)
Control

Overall

Variables
Stock Price

Between

Within

Mean

33.343

Std. Dev.

34.151

29.153

16.051

Minimum

0.080

0.270

-283.9901

Maximum

894.000

674.433

359.4871

Observations/
T-bar

11,801

1,470

8.028

Sales

Mean

9.687

Growth

Std. Dev.

99.340

32.369

93.507

(in integers)

Minimum
Maximum

-284.814
9,259.818

-84.121
1,025.217

-1,114.075
8,244.289

Observations/
T-bar

9,634

1,193

8.075

Book-to-

Mean

50.328

Market

Std. Dev.

93.862

53.224

77.740

Equity
(in integers)

Minimum
Maximum

-5,397.792
1,293.19

-815.340
379.235

-4532.124
1,099.666

8,432

1,194

7.062

S&P 500

Observations/
T-bar
Mean

Member

Std. Dev.

0.444

0.415

0.138

Minimum

0.000

0.000

-0.620

Maximum

1.000

1.000

1.158

Observations/
T-bar

11,804

1,470

8.030

0.269
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TABLE 2:

Inst.
Own.
Bank
Own.
Ins. Co.
Own.
Mut.
Fund
Own.
Corp.
Pens.
Own.
Pub.
Pens.
Own.
Uni/Foun
Own.
Other
Inst.
Own.
Index
CGQ
Industry
CGQ
ISS
Internal
E-Index
G-Index
ISS
External
Ann. Dir.
Elec.
Del.
Incorp.
Irreg.
Restmt
Market
Cap
Trading
Vol.
Res. Cov.
Res.
Activity
Ind.
Diversity
News
Stories
Age
Volatility
Ret.-onEquity
Divs-toEquity
Tang-toAssets
Stock
Price
Sales
Growth
Book-toMkt
S&P 500

Inst.
Own.
1.000

Bank
Own.

Ins. Co.
Own.

Mutual
Fund
Own.

Corp.
Pension
Fund
Own.

Public
Pension
Fund
Own.

Uni/
Foun
Endow.
Own.

Other
Inst.
Own.

0.562‡

1.000

0.249‡

0.108‡

1.000

0.874‡

0.244‡

0.052‡

1.000

0.098‡

-0.031‡

-0.019†

-0.033‡

1.000

0.363‡

0.324‡

0.154‡

0.232‡

-0.027‡

1.000

0.099‡

0.000

-0.000

0.085‡

0.008

0.009

1.000

0.286‡

0.045‡

-0.047‡

0.154‡

-0.001

0.012

0.032‡

1.000

0.076‡

0.034‡

0.004

0.083‡

-0.024†

-.022†

-0.008

0.013

0.241‡

0.222‡

0.043‡

0.156‡

-0.046‡

0.169‡

0.014

0.095‡

0.162‡

0.139‡

0.007

0.107‡

-0.030‡

0.006

0.006

0.123‡

0.068‡
-.029†
0.062‡

0.047‡
0.059‡
-0.013

-0.011
0.027†
-0.006

0.059‡
-0.057‡
0.064‡

-0.076‡
-0.060‡
0.052‡

0.052‡
0.164‡
-0.133‡

0.015
-0.022*
-0.016

0.021*
-0.053‡
0.087‡

0.026‡

0.008

0.025‡

0.008

0.051‡

-.051‡

-0.015

0.032‡

0.171‡

0.068‡

0.042‡

0.157‡

0.021†

0.003

0.003

0.051‡

0.025‡

0.002

-0.006

0.026‡

0.012

0.015

-0.002

0.010

-0.087‡

0.095‡

0.049‡

-0.175‡

0.006

0.062‡

0.027

-0.030‡

-0.023†

0.033‡

0.020†

-0.055‡

-0.004

0.020†

-0.004

-0.002

0.120‡
0.157‡

0.233‡
0.199‡

0.111‡
0.080‡

0.002
0.062‡

0.014
0.025†

0.180‡
0.123‡

0.030†
0.016*

-0.022†
0.020†

-0.020†

0.057‡

-0.000

-0.054‡

0.011

0.083‡

-0.062‡

-0.024†

-0.063‡

0.074‡

0.030‡

-0.127‡

-0.013

0.056‡

-0.007

-0.021†

0.002
-0.032‡
-0.006

0.182‡
-0.087‡
-0.004

0.055‡
-0.079‡
0.002

-0.100‡
0.030‡
-0.008

-0.012
-0.028‡
-0.003

0.221‡
-0.107‡
0.005

-0.050‡
-0.019†
0.013

-0.055‡
0.012
0.003

0.019

0.018

-0.005

0.013

0.002

0.013

0.004

0.013

-0.105‡

-0.068‡

-0.071‡

-0.078‡

-0.015

-0.011

-0.002

-0.022†

0.099‡

0.102‡

0.086‡

0.029‡

0.026‡

0.098‡

0.012

0.105‡

0.001

0.000

-0.008

0.001

0.001

-0.019*

0.017

-0.005

-0.070‡

-0.094‡

0.003

-0.038‡

-0.008

-0.045‡

-0.021*

-0.020*

0.071‡

0.254‡

0.131‡

-0.067‡

0.006

0.216‡

0.000

-0.045‡
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Index
CGQ

Industry
CGQ

ISS
Internal

E-Index

G-Index

ISS
Ext.

Annual
Director
Election

Del.
Incorp.

Irreg,
Restmt

1.000
0.745‡

1.000

0.272†

0.385‡

1.000

-0.072‡
-0.006
0.123‡

-0.037‡
0.061‡
0.098‡

-0.040‡
0.130‡
0.410‡

1.000
0.668‡
-0.513‡

1.000
-0.654‡

1.000

0.183‡

0.165‡

-0.010

-0.554‡

-0.483‡

0.459‡

1.000

-0.028‡

0.058‡

-0.032‡

-0.076‡

-0.155‡

0.209‡

-0.022†

1.000

-0.012

0.002

0.015

-0.020*

-0.030†

0.026‡

0.005

0.013

1.000

0.012

0.159‡

0.119‡

-0.184‡

-0.087‡

0.087‡

0.125‡

0.004

0.020†

0.021†

0.117‡

0.022†

-0.076‡

-0.052‡

0.033‡

0.094‡

0.042‡

0.010

-0.070‡
-0.077‡

0.246‡
0.237‡

0.142‡
0.089‡

-0.086‡
-0.049‡

0.014
-0.003

0.048‡
0.027‡

0.053‡
0.066‡

0.144‡
0.166‡

0.003
-0.014

0.027‡

0.065‡

0.047‡

0.0340‡

0.159‡

-0.069‡

-0.009

-0.074‡

0.001

-0.009

0.114‡

0.081‡

-0.123‡

-0.069‡

0.071‡

0.099‡

0.055‡

0.032‡

0.100‡
-0.001
0.002

0.203‡
-0.072‡
0.022†

0.140‡
-0.263‡
-0.008

0.009
0.015
0.011

0.247‡
-0.081‡
-0.017

-0.094‡
-0.080‡
-0.007

0.060‡
0.052‡
-0.010

-0.203‡
0.085‡
0.016

-0.003
0.018*
0.020*

-0.013

0.010

0.019

0.012

-0.004

0.006

-0.000

0.013

-0.005

0.004

-0.117‡

-0.028†

0.037‡

0.033

-0.055‡

-0.033‡

-0.072‡

-0.029‡

-0.033‡

0.080‡

0.149‡

-0.041‡

0.003

0.047‡

-0.001

0.021*

-0.032‡

0.019*

0.007

-0.025†

0.026†

-0.041‡

-0.012

0.008

0.039‡

-0.003

0.049‡

-0.009

-0.106‡

0.040‡

-0.011

-0.048‡

0.034‡

-0.050‡

0.007

-0.066‡

0.280‡

0.139‡

-0.039‡

0.123‡

-0.024†

0.080‡

0.001

0.010
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TABLE 2:

Market
Cap
Trading
Volume
Research
Coverage
Research
Activity
Industry
Diversity
News
Stories
Age
Volatility
Return-onEquity
Dividendsto-Equity
Tang-toTotal
Assets
Stock
Price
Sales
Growth
Book-toMarket
S&P 500
Member

Research
Coverage

Research
Activity

Industry
Diversity

News
Story
Mentions

Market
Cap
1.000

Trading
Volume

0.339‡

1.000

0.389‡

0.245‡

1.000

0.338‡

0.284‡

0.851‡

1.000

0.118‡

0.048‡

0.046‡

0.009

1.000

0.515‡

0.310‡

0.305‡

0.259‡

0.105‡

1.000

0.266‡
-0.143‡
0.007

0.115‡
0.102‡
0.002

0.175‡
-0.137‡
0.017

0.134‡
0.000
0.012

0.301‡
-0.075‡
-0.004

0.173‡
-0.058‡
0.005

1.000

0.008

0.003

0.004

0.011

0.005

0.004

0.016

-0.020

-0.019*

0.062‡

0.138‡

-0.007

-0.016

0.079‡

0.172‡

-0.022†

0.185‡

0.144‡

0.065‡

0.104‡

0.089‡

0.000

0.001

-0.001

-0.002

-0.027†

-0.003

-0.030‡

-0.049‡

0.063‡

-0.062‡

-0.013

-0.017

-0.028†

-0.017

0.370

0.225‡

0.568‡

0.474‡

0.176†

0.287‡

0.376‡

Age

-0.117‡
0.013
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CORRELATION MATRIX (CONT.)
Volatility

ReturnonEquity

1.000
-0.020*

1.000

-0.016

0.023†

1.000

-0.023†

0.004

0.005

1.000

-0.261‡

0.009

-0.005

-0.050‡

1.000

0.030‡

-0.000

-0.003

-0.002

0.024†

1.000

0.175‡

-0.038‡

-0.013

0.045‡

-0.097‡

0.061‡

1.000

-0.144‡

0.032‡

0.027

-0.025†

0.167‡

-0.018*

-0.037‡

Dividends
-to-Equity

Tangible
-to-Total
Assets

Stock
Price

Sales
Growth

Book-toMarket
Equity

S&P 500
Member

1.000

Table 2 reports pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables
used in the analysis of the relationship between institutional ownership
and corporate governance. *, †, and ‡ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively. Higher values of “ISS Index CGQ,” “ISS
Industry CGQ,” and “ISS Internal Governance Score” reflect higher quality
(primarily or exclusively internal governance (e.g., board independence).
Higher values of “E-Index” and “G-Index” reflect lower quality external
governance (i.e., less exposure to the market for corporate control). Lower
values of “ISS External Governance Score” represent lower quality
external governance. “Annual director elections (i.e., no staggered board)”
is a measure of high-quality external governance.
307

(3.35)
[0.000]

0.001‡

[0.001]

(1.74)

0.003*

(3)
Institutional
Ownership

-0.003
(-0.57)
[0.005]

(4)
Institutional
Ownership

(5)
Institutional
Ownership

(6)
Institutional
Ownership

(7)
Institutional
Ownership

G-Index

0.002
(1.03)
[0.002]
Table 3 reports ordinary least squares regression results estimating the relationship between institutional ownership and seven different metrics
of corporate governance quality as of March 31, 2010, with the exception of column 5, which is as of March 31, 2007. Higher values of ISS Index
CGQ, ISS Industry CGQ and ISS Internal Governance Score reflect higher quality (primarily or exclusively internal governance (e.g., board
independence). Higher values of E-Index and G-Index reflect lower quality external governance (i.e., less exposure to the market for corporate
control). Lower values of ISS External Governance Score represent lower quality external governance. Annual director elections (i.e., no
staggered board) is a measure of high quality external governance. *, †, and ‡ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors.

E-Index

ISS
Internal
Governance
Score

ISS
Industry
CGQ

(2)
Institutional
Ownership

98

ISS Index
CGQ

(1)
Institutional
Ownership
0.001‡
(2.81)
[0.000]

TABLE 3: 2010 OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS
ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
AND SELECTED MEASURES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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Volatility

Age (Months)

News Days

Diverse

Size, Volume,
Research

Irregularity
Restatement
History

Delaware
Incorporation

Annual
Director
Elections
0.028†
(2.57)
[0.011]
0.023
(1.46)
[0.015]
0.013†
(2.15)
[0.006]
-0.012
(-1.04)
[0.012]
-0.020‡
(-3.90)
[0.005]
-0.008
(-0.89)
[0.009]
0.074‡
(5.55)
[0.013]

0.029‡
(2.70)
[0.011]
0.018
(1.02)
[0.017]
0.016‡
(2.72)
[0.006]
-0.013
(-1.13)
[0.012]
-0.020‡
(-3.88)
[0.005]
-0.008
(-0.88)
[0.009]
0.078‡
(5.81)
[0.013]

(2)
Institutional
Ownership

[0.019]
0.016‡
(2.72)
[0.006]
-0.012
(-1.01)
[0.012]
-0.020‡
(-3.79)
[0.005]
-0.006
(-0.64)
[0.009]
0.078‡
(5.83)
[0.013]

0.031‡
(2.85)
[0.011]
0.033*
(1.73)

(3)
Institutional
Ownership

[0.017]
0.012†
(2.01)
[0.006]
-0.012
(-1.06)
[0.012]
-0.018‡
(-3.59)
[0.005]
-0.008
(-0.85)
[0.009]
0.074‡
(5.54)
[0.013]

0.028‡
(2.66)
[0.011]
0.024
(1.46)

(4)
Institutional
Ownership

[0.048]
0.008
(1.25)
[0.007]
-0.019
(-1.50)
[0.013]
-0.009
(-1.36)
[0.007]
-0.005
(-0.52)
[0.009]
0.122‡
(6.41)
[0.019]

0.036‡
(3.00)
[0.012]
-0.002
(-0.04)

(5)
Institutional
Ownership

[0.017]
0.017‡
(2.75)
[0.006]
-0.011
(-0.94)
[0.012]
-0.020‡
(-3.75)
[0.005]
-0.005
(-0.59)
[0.009]
0.076‡
(5.68)
[0.013]

0.029‡
(2.65)
[0.011]
0.032*
(1.96)

[0.002]

(6)
Institutional
Ownership
0.001
(0.39)

[0.021]
0.016‡
(2.69)
[0.006]
-0.011
(-0.96)
[0.012]
-0.021‡
(-3.94)
[0.005]
-0.006
(-0.70)
[0.009]
0.077‡
(5.74)
[0.013]

(1.77)
[0.011]
0.030‡
(2.80)
[0.011]
0.034
(1.62)

0.019*

(7)
Institutional
Ownership

No. 1:1]

ISS External
Governance
Score

(1)
Institutional
Ownership
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-1.179‡
(-6.63)
[0.178]
0.001
(0.31)
[0.004]
0.051‡
(4.80)
[0.011]
-0.000
(-0.94)
[0.000]
-0.001‡
(-3.35)
[0.000]
-0.026
(-1.59)
[0.017]
0.830‡
(11.67)
[0.071]
619
0.31

-1.191‡
(-6.74)
[0.177]
-0.002
(-0.42)
[0.004]
0.049‡
(4.62)
[0.011]
-0.000
(-0.96)
[0.000]
-0.001‡
(-4.02)
[0.000]
-0.017
(-1.05)
[0.016]
0.912‡
(14.51)
[0.063]
619
0.30

Dividendsto-Equity
Tangible
Assets To
Total Assets
Stock Price

Sales
Growth
Book-toMarket
Equity
S&P 500

Constant

0.856‡
(10.72)
[0.080]
619
0.30

-0.026
(-1.51)
[0.017]

-0.001‡
(-3.89)
[0.000]

-0.000
(-0.89)
[0.000]

0.049‡
(4.56)
[0.011]

-0.002
(-0.45)
[0.004]

-1.200‡
(-6.79)
[0.177]

(3)
Institutional
Ownership
0.034
(0.73)
[0.047]

0.960‡
(15.00)
[0.064]
618
0.29

-0.016
(-0.95)
[0.016]

-0.001‡
(-4.01)
[0.000]

-0.001
(-1.23)
[0.000]

0.045‡
(4.17)
[0.011]

-0.003
(-0.72)
[0.004]

-1.231‡
(-6.95)
[0.177]

(4)
Institutional
Ownership
0.037
(0.79)
[0.047]

1.025‡
(11.64)
[0.088]
780
0.23

-0.028
(-1.62)
[0.017]

-0.000
(-1.27)
[0.000]

-0.000
(-0.65)
[0.000]

0.049‡
(3.39)
[0.015]

0.004
(0.85)
[0.005]

-1.131‡
(-5.69)
[0.199]

(5)
Institutional
Ownership
0.065
(1.08)
[0.061]

0.921‡
(14.31)
[0.064]
619
0.29

-0.022
(-1.32)
[0.016]

-0.001‡
(-3.80)
[0.000]

-0.000
(-1.00)
[0.000]

0.048‡
(4.45)
[0.011]

-0.002
(-0.40)
[0.004]

-1.209‡
(-6.84)
[0.177]

(6)
Institutional
Ownership
0.035
(0.75)
[0.047]

0.922‡
(14.84)
[0.062]
620
0.30

-0.023
(-1.38)
[0.017]

-0.001‡
(-3.83)
[0.000]

-0.000
(-1.09)
[0.000]

0.050‡
(4.70)
[0.011]

-0.002
(-0.44)
[0.004]

-1.210‡
(-6.88)
[0.176]

(7)
Institutional
Ownership
0.034
(0.73)
[0.047]

100
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Observations
R-squared

Return
on Equity

(2)
Institutional
Ownership
0.025
(0.55)
[0.046]

(1)
Institutional
Ownership
0.024
(0.51)
[0.046]
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0.001‡
(2.81)
[0.000]
619
0.30

0.000†
(2.01)
[0.000]
619
0.07

0.000
(0.19)
[0.000]
619
0.08

(3)
Insurance
Company
Ownership
0.000‡
(2.64)
[0.000]
619
0.28

(4)
Mutual Fund
Ownership

-0.000
(-0.33)
[0.000]
619
0.11

(5)
Corporate
Pension
Ownership
0.000
(1.08)
[0.000]
619
0.18

(6)
Public
Pension
Ownership

-0.000
(-0.58)
[0.000]
619
0.08

(7)
University/
Foundation
Endowment
Ownership

-0.000
(-0.01)
[0.000]
619
0.08

(8)
Other
Institutional
Ownership

Observations
R-squared
Table 4 reports ordinary least squares regression results estimating the relationship between institutional ownership (overall and by type) and seven
different metrics of corporate governance quality, as of March 31, 2010, with the exception of results for G-Index, which is as of March 31, 2007. Higher
values of ISS Index CGQ, ISS Industry CGQ and ISS Internal Governance Score reflect higher quality (primarily or exclusively internal governance (e.g.,
board independence). Higher values of E-Index and G-Index reflect lower quality external governance (i.e., less exposure to the market for corporate
control). Lower values of ISS External Governance Score represent lower quality external governance. Annual director elections (i.e., no staggered board) is
a measure of high quality external governance. *, †, and ‡ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. Control variable results are excluded. Control variables are
Delaware incorporation; irregularity restatement history; size, trading volume, research coverage, research activity, as one combined variable; industry
diversity; news story days; age; volatility; return on equity; dividends; asset tangibility; stock price; sales growth; book-to-market equity; and membership in
the S&P 500.

ISS
Index CGQ

(2)
Bank
Ownership

No. 1:1]

(1)
Overall
Institutional
Ownership

TABLE 4: 2010 OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS
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619
0.08
0.001*
(1.95)
[0.001]
619
0.07
0.005†
(2.12)
[0.002]
618
0.07

619
0.31
0.003*
(1.74)
[0.001]
619
0.30
-0.003
(-0.57)
[0.005]
618
0.29

Observations
R-squared
ISS Internal
Governance
Score
Observations
R-squared
E-Index

Observations
R-squared

0.000†
(2.35)
[0.000]

0.001‡
(3.35)
[0.000]

ISS Industry
CGQ

0.000
(0.09)
[0.001]
618
0.07

(-0.35)
[0.000]
619
0.08

-0.000

619
0.08

0.000
(1.29)
[0.000]

(3)
Insurance
Company
Ownership

-0.006
(-1.31)
[0.005]
618
0.27

(0.82)
[0.001]
619
0.27

0.001

619
0.28

0.001‡
(2.83)
[0.000]

(4)
Mutual Fund
Ownership

-0.000
(-1.31)
[0.000]
618
0.11

(-0.43)
[0.000]
619
0.11

-0.000

619
0.11

-0.000
(-0.13)
[0.000]

(5)
Corporate
Pension
Ownership

0.000
(1.59)
[0.000]
618
0.15

(1.57)
[0.000]
619
0.18

0.000

619
0.18

0.000*
(1.71)
[0.000]

(6)
Public Pension
Ownership

TABLE 4: 2010 OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS (CONT.)

0.000
(0.48)
[0.000]
618
0.08

(-0.61)
[0.000]
619
0.08

-0.000

619
0.08

-0.001
(-0.87)
[0.001]
618
0.08

(1.21)
[0.000]
619
0.08

0.000

619
0.08

(7)
(8)
University/
Other
Foundation
Institutional
Endowment
Ownership
Ownership
-0.000
0.000
(-0.92)
(0.69)
[0.000]
[0.000]
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(1)
(2)
Overall
Bank
Institutional Ownership
Ownership
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Observations
R-squared

-0.003

620
0.07

620
0.30

Annual
Director
Elections
(-0.56)
[0.005]

ISS External
Governance
Score
Observations
R-squared

(1.77)
[0.011]

-0.001
(-0.64)
[0.001]
619
0.07

0.001
(0.39)
[0.002]
619
0.29

Observations
R-squared

0.019*

0.001
(1.07)
[0.001]
780
0.09

0.002
(1.03)
[0.002]
780
0.23

(3)

620
0.08

(-0.31)
[0.002]

-0.001

-0.000
(-0.74)
[0.000]
619
0.08

0.001†
(2.07)
[0.000]
780
0.09

Insurance
Company
Ownership

620
0.27

(2.36)
[0.009]

0.021†

0.002
(1.25)
[0.002]
619
0.27

0.002
(0.77)
[0.002]
780
0.27

620
0.11

(1.17)
[0.000]

0.000

-0.000
(-0.05)
[0.000]
619
0.11

-0.000
(-0.01)
[0.000]
780
0.09

(5)
Corporate
Pension
Ownership

(4)
Mutual Fund
Ownership

(6)

620
0.17

(-0.57)
[0.001]

-0.000

-0.000
(-1.42)
[0.000]
619
0.18

0.001‡
(4.42)
[0.000]
780
0.12

Public Pension
Ownership

(7)

(8)

620
0.08

(-0.85)
[0.000]

-0.000

-0.000
(-0.78)
[0.000]
619
0.08

620
0.08

(0.35)
[0.002]

0.001

-0.000
(-0.36)
[0.000]
619
0.08

University/
Other
Foundation
Institutional
Endowment
Ownership
Ownership
0.000
0.000
(0.18)
(1.04)
[0.000]
[0.000]
780
780
0.07
0.09

No. 1:1]

G-Index

(2)
Bank
Ownership

(1)
Overall
Institutional
Ownership
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0.001‡
(5.34)
[0.000]
0.004‡
(3.46)
[0.001]

(3)
Institutional
Ownership

0.004
(1.18)
[0.003]

(4)
Institutional
Ownership

0.003*
(1.74)
[0.002]

(5)
Institutional
Ownership

(6)
Institutional
Ownership

(7)
Institutional
Ownership

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Table 5 reports the results of pooled OLS regression analysis, using year fixed effects and clustering at the firm level, which estimates the
relationship between overall institutional ownership and seven different metrics of corporate governance quality for the years 2002–2010. Higher
values of ISS Index CGQ, ISS Industry CGQ and ISS Internal reflect higher quality (primarily or exclusively internal governance (e.g., board
independence). Higher values of E-Index and G-Index reflect lower quality external governance (i.e., less exposure to the market for corporate
control). ISS External and Annual Director Elections (i.e., no staggered board) are measures of high quality external governance. *, †, and ‡
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Numbers in brackets are robust standard
errors.

G-Index

E-Index

ISS
Internal
Governance
Score

ISS
Industry
CGQ

ISS Index
CGQ

(2)
Institutional
Ownership

104

(1)
Institutional
Ownership
0.000†
(2.42)
[0.000]

TABLE 5: POOLED OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS WITH CLUSTERING
AT THE FIRM LEVEL AND YEAR FIXED EFFECTS
ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
AND SELECTED MEASURES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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0.059‡
(3.35)
[0.018]
0.008*
(1.95)
[0.004]
-0.006
(-0.57)
[0.010]
-0.017‡
(-3.57)
[0.005]
-0.009
(-1.44)
[0.007]

0.058‡
(3.26)
[0.018]
0.010†
(2.31)
[0.004]
-0.007
(-0.69)
[0.010]
-0.016‡
(-3.52)
[0.005]
-0.007
(-1.13)
[0.007]

Irregularity
Restatement
History
Size, Volume,
Research

News Days

Age (Months)

Diverse

0.034‡
(3.56)
[0.010]

0.037‡
(3.78)
[0.010]

Delaware
Incorporation

Annual
Director
Elections

-0.008
(-1.13)
[0.007]

-0.016‡
(-3.54)
[0.005]

0.010†
(2.24)
[0.004]
-0.007
(-0.72)
[0.010]

0.057‡
(3.19)
[0.018]

0.037‡
(3.89)
[0.010]

-0.007
(-1.10)
[0.006]

-0.015‡
(-3.36)
[0.004]

0.009†
(2.05)
[0.004]
-0.009
(-0.93)
[0.010]

0.054†
(2.56)
[0.021]

0.036‡
(3.90)
[0.009]

-0.008
(-1.11)
[0.007]

-0.010*
(-1.72)
[0.006]

0.006
(1.23)
[0.005]
-0.009
(-0.79)
[0.011]

0.056‡
(2.65)
[0.021]

0.044‡
(4.26)
[0.010]

-0.006
(-0.92)
[0.007]

-0.016‡
(-3.46)
[0.005]

0.010†
(2.37)
[0.004]
-0.007
(-0.69)
[0.010]

0.057‡
(3.13)
[0.018]

0.038‡
(3.96)
[0.010]

-0.006
(-0.85)
[0.007]

-0.017‡
(-3.61)
[0.005]

0.010†
(2.29)
[0.004]
-0.007
(-0.66)
[0.010]

0.051‡
(2.81)
[0.018]

0.038‡
(3.92)
[0.010]

0.015
(1.64)
[0.009]

No. 1:1]

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
-0.002
ISS External
(-0.90)
Governance
[0.002]
Score
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-1.201‡
(-10.25)
[0.117]
0.006
(1.49)
[0.004]
0.056‡
(7.17)
[0.008]
-0.001‡
(-2.93)
[0.000]
-0.000‡
(-2.70)
[0.000]
-0.017
(-1.44)
[0.012]
6,086
0.25
905

-1.202‡
(-10.21)
[0.118]
0.004
(0.96)
[0.004]
0.056‡
(7.03)
[0.008]
-0.001‡
(-3.17)
[0.000]
-0.000‡
(-3.08)
[0.000]
-0.005
(-0.44)
[0.012]
6,086
0.24
905

Dividends-toEquity

6,086
0.24
905

-0.012
(-1.00)
[0.012]

-0.000‡
(-3.18)
[0.000]

-0.001‡
(-2.92)
[0.000]

0.055‡
(6.97)
[0.008]

0.003
(0.87)
[0.004]

-1.224‡
(-10.45)
[0.117]

0.032
(1.24)
[0.026]

5,630
0.26
909

-0.008
(-0.68)
[0.012]

-0.000‡
(-3.47)
[0.000]

-0.001‡
(-3.66)
[0.000]

0.053‡
(6.71)
[0.008]

0.001
(0.37)
[0.004]

-1.219‡
(-10.43)
[0.117]

0.025
(0.99)
[0.025]

3,803
0.24
866

-0.006
(-0.40)
[0.014]

-0.000†
(-2.17)
[0.000]

-0.001†
(-2.45)
[0.000]

0.071‡
(6.87)
[0.010]

0.003
(0.59)
[0.004]

-1.352‡
(-9.51)
[0.142]

0.056
(1.56)
[0.036]

6,086
0.24
905

-0.008
(-0.63)
[0.012]

-0.000‡
(-2.87)
[0.000]

-0.001‡
(-3.16)
[0.000]

0.055‡
(6.79)
[0.008]

0.003
(0.87)
[0.004]

-1.203‡
(-10.26)
[0.117]

0.034
(1.29)
[0.026]

6,131
0.24
906

-0.009
(-0.77)
[0.012]

-0.000‡
(-2.98)
[0.000]

-0.001‡
(-3.37)
[0.000]

0.058‡
(7.18)
[0.008]

0.003
(0.87)
[0.004]

-1.191‡
(-10.13)
[0.118]

0.030
(1.16)
[0.026]

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Observations
R-squared
Firms

Book-toMarket
Equity
S&P 500

Sales Growth

Stock Price

Tangible
Assets To
Total Assets

0.023
(0.90)
[0.026]

0.029
(1.10)
[0.026]

Return on
Equity

106

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
0.084‡
0.082‡
0.086‡
0.086‡
0.086‡
0.084‡
0.084‡
Volatility
(8.55)
(8.38)
(8.73)
(8.92)
(7.43)
(8.47)
(8.52)
[0.010]
[0.010]
[0.010]
[0.010]
[0.012]
[0.010]
[0.010]
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0.000†
(2.42)
[0.000]

0.000†
(2.42)
[0.000]

0.000‡
(2.98)
[0.000]

(3)
Insurance
Company
Ownership
0.000†
(2.04)
[0.000]

0.000
(1.31)
[0.000]

(4)
(5)
Mutual
Corporate
Fund
Pension
Ownership Ownership

-0.000
(-0.27)
[0.000]

(6)
Public
Pension
Ownership

(7)
University/
Foundation
Endowment
Ownership
0.000
(0.25)
[0.000]

-0.000
(-0.40)
[0.000]

(8)
Other
Institutional
Ownership

6,086
6,086
6,086
6,086
6,086
6,086
6,086
6,086
Observations
0.24
0.12
0.10
0.26
0.11
0.31
0.06
0.10
R-squared
905
905
905
905
905
905
905
905
Firms
Table 6 reports the results of pooled OLS regression analysis, using year fixed effects and clustering at the firm level, which estimates the
relationship between institutional ownership (overall and by type of institution) and seven different metrics of corporate governance quality
for the years 2002-2010. Higher values of ISS Index CGQ, ISS Industry CGQ and ISS Internal reflect higher quality (primarily or exclusively
internal governance (e.g., board independence). Higher values of E-Index and G-Index reflect lower quality external governance (i.e., less
exposure to the market for corporate control). ISS External and Annual Director Elections (i.e., no staggered board) are measures of high
quality external governance. *, †, and ‡ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are tstatistics. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. Control variable results are excluded. Control variables are Delaware
incorporation; irregularity restatement history; size, trading volume, research coverage, research activity, as one combined variable; industry
diversity; news story days; age; volatility; return on equity; dividends; asset tangibility; stock price; sales growth; book-to-market equity; and
membership in the S&P 500.

ISS Index
CGQ

(1)
(2)
Overall
Bank
Institutional Ownership
Ownership

No. 1:1]
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0.002‡
(5.55)
[0.000]
6,086
0.13
905
0.003†
(2.30)
[0.001]
5,630
0.12
909
0.001†
(2.10)
[0.001]
3,803
0.16
866

0.004‡
(3.46)
[0.001]
6,086
0.24
905
0.004
(1.18)
[0.003]
5,630
0.26
909
0.003*
(1.74)
[0.002]
3,803
0.24
866

ISS Internal
Governance
Score
Observations
R-squared
Firms
E-Index

G-Index

Observations
R-squared
Firms

Observations
R-squared
Firms

3,803
0.27
866

0.002
(1.15)
[0.002]

0.002
(0.74)
[0.003]
5,630
0.29
909

0.001*
(1.83)
[0.001]
6,086
0.26
905

(4)
Mutual
Fund
Ownership
0.001‡
(4.33)
[0.000]
6,086
0.27
905

3,803
0.14
866

0.000
(0.99)
[0.000]

-0.000
(-0.95)
[0.000]
5,630
0.11
909

0.000*
(1.87)
[0.000]
6,086
0.11
905

(5)
Corporate
Pension
Ownership
0.000
(1.58)
[0.000]
6,086
0.11
905

3,803
0.25
866

0.001‡
(6.54)
[0.000]

0.001‡
(6.09)
[0.000]
5,630
0.32
909

0.000‡
(4.33)
[0.000]
6,086
0.32
905

(6)
Public
Pension
Ownership
0.000‡
(4.53)
[0.000]
6,086
0.32
905

3,803
0.07
866

0.000
(0.51)
[0.000]

0.000
(1.56)
[0.000]
5,630
0.07
909

0.000
(0.39)
[0.000]
6,086
0.06
905

(7) Univ. /
Foundation
Endowment
Ownership
0.000
(0.66)
[0.000]
6,086
0.06
905

3,803
0.13
866

-0.000
(-0.36)
[0.000]

-0.000
(-0.41)
[0.000]
5,630
0.11
909

0.000
(0.16)
[0.000]
6,086
0.10
905

(8)
Other
Institutional
Ownership
0.000*
(1.78)
[0.000]
6,086
0.10
905
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3,803
0.11
866

0.001‡
(2.83)
[0.000]

0.001*
(1.93)
[0.000]
5,630
0.09
909

0.000‡
(3.99)
[0.000]
6,086
0.10
905

(3)
Insurance
Company
Ownership
0.000‡
(3.38)
[0.000]
6,086
0.10
905
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Observations
R-squared
Firms

0.000‡
(4.91)
[0.000]
6,086
0.13
905

ISS Industry
CGQ

(2)
Bank
Ownership

(1)
Overall
Institutional
Ownership
0.001‡
(5.34)
[0.000]
6,086
0.25
905

TABLE 6: POOLED OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS WITH CLUSTERING
AT THE FIRM LEVEL AND YEAR FIXED EFFECTS (CONT.)
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-0.001*
(-1.96)
[0.001]
6,086
0.12
905
-0.003
(-1.15)
[0.003]
6,131
0.12
906

6,086
0.24
905
0.015
(1.64)
[0.009]
6,131
0.24
906

Observations
R-squared
Firms
Annual
Director
Elections
Observations
R-squared
Firms

(2)
Bank
Ownership

6,131
0.10
906

-0.001
(-0.90)
[0.001]

6,086
0.10
905

(3)
Insurance
Company
Ownership
-0.000†
(-2.02)
[0.000]

6,131
0.26
906

0.012*
(1.71)
[0.007]

6,086
0.26
905

(4)
Mutual
Fund
Ownership
-0.001
(-0.45)
[0.001]

6,131
0.11
906

0.000
(1.61)
[0.000]

6,086
0.11
905

(5)
Corporate
Pension
Ownership
0.000
(1.02)
[0.000]

6,131
0.31
906

-0.001‡
(-2.62)
[0.000]

6,086
0.33
905

6,131
0.06
906

-0.000
(-1.06)
[0.000]

6,086
0.07
905

6,131
0.11
906

0.002
(1.49)
[0.001]

6,086
0.10
905

(6)
(7) Univ./
(8)
Public
Foundation
Other
Pension
Endowment Institutional
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
-0.000‡
-0.000
0.000
(-6.08)
(-1.31)
(0.60)
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]

No. 1:1]

(1)
Overall
Institutional
Ownership
-0.002
ISS External
(-0.90)
Governance
[0.002]
Score

TABLE 6: POOLED OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS WITH CLUSTERING
AT THE FIRM LEVEL AND YEAR FIXED EFFECTS (CONT.)
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APPENDIX A: INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT FACTORS308
A. Board Issues
1. At least two-thirds of the directors on the board
should be independent.
2. The nominating committee of the board should be
composed solely of independent directors.
3. The compensation committee of the board should be
composed solely of independent directors.
4. The functions of a governance committee should be
handled by a committee of the board, typically the
nominating committee or the governance committee.
5. Directors should be accountable to shareholders on an
annual basis. [No staggered board.]
6. Boards should not have fewer than 6 members or
more than 15 members.
7. Shareholders should have the right to vote on changes
to expand or contract the size of the board.
8. Shareholders should have the right to cumulate their
votes for directors.
9. In addition to serving on his own company’s board,
the CEO should not serve on more than two other
boards of public companies.
10. Outside directorships should be limited to service on
the boards of five or fewer public companies. (Note:
Raw data indicates number is four boards, not five.)
11. Former CEOs should not serve on the board of
directors.
12. The positions of chairman and CEO should be
separated or a lead director should be specified.
13. Board guidelines should be published in the proxy on
an annual basis.

308 ISS BEST PRACTICES USER GUIDE & GLOSSARY (2003). This list
ignores combination factors. CGQ factors differ slightly in the years 2006–
2010. Items in bold (Nos. 23–27, 33–34, 60) are omitted from the analysis
of individual governance factors for the reasons described above.
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14. Management should take action on all shareholder
proposals supported by a majority vote within 12
months of the shareholders’ meeting.
15. Directors should attend at least 75% of board
meetings.
16. Shareholders should be given an opportunity to vote
on all directors selected to fill vacancies.
17. CEOs should not be the subject of transactions that
create conflicts of interest as disclosed in the proxy
statement.
B. Audit
18. The audit committee of the board should be composed
solely of independent directors.
19. The company should disclose its policy with respect to
the rotation of auditors.
20. Consulting fees (audit-related and other) should be
less than audit fees.
21. Shareholders should be permitted to ratify
management’s selection of auditors each year.
C. Charter/Bylaws
22. No poison pill or shareholder approved poison pill.
23. [Omit because combined no poison pill with
shareholder approved poison pill because it is
not possible to get points in both categories.]
24. If there is a poison pill, it should have a threeyear independent director evaluation. [Omit
because only applies to subset of companies
with poison pills]
25. If there is a poison pill, it should have a sunset
provision. [Omit because only applies to subset
of companies with poison pills]
26. If there is a poison pill, it should have a
qualified offer clause. [Omit because only
applies to subset of companies with poison pills]
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27. If there is a poison pill, it should have a trigger
threshold of 20 percent or more. [Omit because
only applies to subset of companies with poison
pills]
28. A simple majority vote should be required to amend
the charter/bylaws.
29. A simple majority vote should be required to approve
mergers or business combinations
30. Shareholders should be permitted to act by written
consent.
31. Shareholders should be permitted to call special
meetings.
32. Management should not be permitted to amend the
bylaws without shareholder approval.
33. [Omit because discrepancy between raw data
(“Single class of stock, with or without blank
check preferred”) and ISS standard which
states: Common stock entitled to one vote per
share and declawed preferred stock are viewed
favorably.]
D. Antitakeover Provisions
33. The company is incorporated in a state with no
antitakeover statutes. [Omit because of
potential for overlap with 35-40]
34. The company is incorporated in a state without a
control share acquisition statute or has opted out.
35. The company is incorporated in a state without a
control share cash out statute or has opted out.
36. The company is incorporated in a state without a
freezeout statute or has opted out.
37. The company is incorporated in a state without a fair
price provision statute or has opted out.
38. The company is not incorporated in a state with a
stakeholder constituency statute or has opted out.
39. The company is not incorporated in a state with a
poison pill endorsement statute.
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E. Executive and Director Compensation
40. The cost of the company’s stock-based incentive plans
is not more than ISS’ cap.
41. Options have not been repriced in the past [three
years] without prior shareholder approval.
42. Company policy prohibits option repricing without
prior shareholder approval.
43. All stock-based incentive plans should be submitted to
shareholders for approval.
44. No interlocking directors should serve on the
Compensation Committee.
45. Directors should receive a portion of their
compensation in the form of stock.
46. Non-Employee directors should not participate in
pension plans.
47. The company has adopted FAS 123 and expenses
options.
48. The company’s burn rate is excessive where average
annual option grants exceed three percent of
outstanding shares over the past three years.
49. New loan programs under stock option plans are
prohibited.
F. Progressive Practices
50. Directors are subject to mandatory retirement age or
term limits
51. A policy of conducting regular board performance
reviews should be disclosed.
52. A policy specifying that directors should meet without
the CEO should be disclosed.
53. A board-approved CEO succession plan should be in
place.
54. A policy authorizing the board to hire its own advisors
should be disclosed.
55. A policy requiring directors to resign upon a change in
job status should be disclosed.
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G. Ownership
56. Each director [with more than one year of service]
owns stock in the company.
57. Executives should be subject to stock ownership
guidelines.
58. Directors should be subject to stock ownership
guidelines.
59. Officers and directors should have a significant
ownership position in their company’s stock.
[Omit because no percentage specified by ISS]
H. Director Education
60. All board members should participate in “ISS
accredited” director education programs.
APPENDIX B: ISS INTERNAL FACTORS309
A. Board Issues
1. At least two-thirds of the directors on the board
should be independent.
2. The nominating committee of the board should be
composed solely of independent directors.
3. The compensation committee of the board should be
composed solely of independent directors.
4. The functions of a governance committee should be
handled by a committee of the board, typically the
nominating committee or the governance committee.
5. Boards should not have fewer than 6 members or
more than 15 members.
6. Shareholders should have the right to cumulate their
votes for directors.
309
If ISS data indicate company’s disclosures do not provide the
information, firm gets no points under my analysis. This is a rare
occurrence. CGQ factors differ slightly in the years 2006–2010. Also, item
in bold (No. 60) is omitted from the analysis of individual governance
factors for the reason described above.
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8. In addition to serving on his own company’s board,
the CEO should not serve on more than two other
boards of public companies.
9. Outside directorships should be limited to service on
the boards of five or fewer public companies. (Note:
Raw data indicates number is four boards, not five.)
10. Former CEOs should not serve on the board of
directors.
11. The positions of chairman and CEO should be
separated or a lead director should be specified.
12. Board guidelines should be published in the proxy on
an annual basis.
13. Management should take action on all shareholder
proposals supported by a majority vote within 12
months of the shareholders’ meeting.
14. Directors should attend at least 75% of board
meetings.
15. CEOs should not be the subject of transactions that
create conflicts of interest as disclosed in the proxy
statement.
B. Audit
18. The audit committee of the board should be composed
solely of independent directors.
19. The company should disclose its policy with respect to
the rotation of auditors.
20. Consulting fees (audit-related and other) should be
less than audit fees.
21. Shareholders should be permitted to ratify
management’s selection of auditors each year.
C. Executive and Director Compensation
41. The cost of the company’s stock-based incentive plans
is not more than ISS’ cap.
42. Options have not been repriced in the past [three
years] without prior shareholder approval.
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43. Company policy prohibits option repricing without
prior shareholder approval.
44. All stock-based incentive plans should be submitted to
shareholders for approval.
45. No interlocking directors should serve on the
Compensation Committee.
46. Directors should receive a portion of their
compensation in the form of stock.
47. Non-employee directors should not participate in
pension plans.
48. The company has adopted FAS 123 and expenses
options.
49. The company’s burn rate is excessive where average
annual option grants exceed three percent of
outstanding shares over the past three years.
50. New loan programs under stock option plans are
prohibited.
D. Progressive Practices
51. Directors are subject to mandatory retirement age or
term limits
52. A policy of conducting regular board performance
reviews should be disclosed.
53. A policy specifying that directors should meet without
the CEO should be disclosed.
54. A board-approved CEO succession plan should be in
place.
55. A policy authorizing the board to hire its own advisors
should be disclosed.
56. A policy requiring directors to resign upon a change in
job status should be disclosed.
E. Ownership
57. Each director [with more than one year of service]
owns stock in the company.
58. Executives should be subject to stock ownership
guidelines.
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59. Directors should be subject to stock ownership
guidelines.
60. Officers and directors should have a significant
ownership position in their company’s stock.
[Omit because no percentage specified by ISS]
F. Director Education
61. All board members should participate in “ISS
accredited” director education programs.
APPENDIX C: ENTRENCHMENT INDEX
The Entrenchment Index is based on the following six
provisions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Staggered (classified) boards
Limits on shareholder bylaw amendments
Supermajority voting requirements for mergers
Supermajority voting requirements for charter
amendments
5. Poison pills
6. Golden parachutes
APPENDIX D: G-INDEX310
A. Delay
1.
2.
3.
4.

Blank Check
Classified Board
Special Meeting
Written Consent

310
The G-Index is based on 28 provisions—22 firm-level
characteristics and 6 state laws, 4 of which are analogous to 4 of the firmlevel characteristics, for a net 24 provisions. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii &
Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON.
107 (2003).
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B. Protection
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Compensation Plans
Contracts
Golden Parachutes
Indemnification
Liability
Severance

C. Voting
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Bylaws
Charter
Cumulative Voting
Secret Ballot
Supermajority
Unequal Voting

D. Other

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Antigreenmail
Directors’ Duties
Fair Price
Pension Parachutes
Poison Pill
Silver Parachutes

E. State
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Antigreenmail Law
Business Combination Law
Cash-out Law
Directors’ Duties Law
Fair Price Law
Control Share Acquisition Law

[Vol. 2015
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APPENDIX E: ISS EXTERNAL FACTORS311
A. Board Issues
5. Directors should be accountable to shareholders on an
annual basis [No staggered board].
7. Shareholders should have the right to vote on changes
to expand or contract the size of the board.
16. Shareholders should be given an opportunity to vote
on all directors selected to fill vacancies.
B. Charter/Bylaws
22. No poison pill or shareholder approved poison pill
23. [Omit because combined no poison pill with
shareholder approved poison pill because it is
not possible to get points in both categories.]
24. If there is a poison pill, it should have a threeyear independent director evaluation. [Omit
because only applies to subset of companies
with poison pills]
25. If there is a poison pill, it should have a sunset
provision. [Omit because only applies to subset
of companies with poison pills]
26. If there is a poison pill, it should have a
qualified offer clause. [Omit because only
applies to subset of companies with poison pills]
27. If there is a poison pill, it should have a trigger
threshold of 20 percent or more. [Omit because
only applies to subset of companies with poison
pills]
28. A simple majority vote should be required to amend
the charter/bylaws.

311
If ISS data indicate company’s disclosures do not provide the
information, firm gets no points under my analysis. This is a rare
occurrence. CGQ factors differ slightly in the years 2006–2010. Also, items
in bold (Nos. 23–27, 33–34) are omitted from the analysis of individual
governance factors for the reason described above.
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29. A simple majority vote should be required to approve
mergers or business combinations
30. Shareholders should be permitted to act by written
consent.
31. Shareholders should be permitted to call special
meetings.
32. Management should not be permitted to amend the
bylaws without shareholder approval.
33. [Omit because discrepancy between raw data
(“Single class of stock, with or without blank
check preferred”) and ISS standard which
states: Common stock entitled to one vote per
share and declawed preferred stock are viewed
favorably.]
C. Antitakeover Provisions
34. The company is incorporated in a state with no
antitakeover statutes. [Omit because of
potential for overlap with 35-40]
35. The company is incorporated in a state without a
control share acquisition statute or has opted out.
36. The company is incorporated in a state without a
control share cash out statute or has opted out.
37. The company is incorporated in a state without a
freezeout statute or has opted out.
38. The company is incorporated in a state without a fair
price provision statute or has opted out.
39. The company is not incorporated in a state with a
stakeholder constituency statute or has opted out.
40. The company is not incorporated in a state with a
poison pill endorsement statute.

